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Lawyers are regularly called upon to make decisions with ethical
consequences. In criminal cases, the client's freedom often depends upon the
defense lawyer's decisions, and within the arena of capital punishment, the stakes
are literally life-and-death. Death penalty representations are, accordingly,
inherently fraught with some of the most difficult ethical choices that the lawyer
can face. Among the most difficult of these choices is what to do when the death
row client wishes to terminate his appeals and to volunteer for execution. The
death row volunteer forces the capital attorney to make excruciating decisions
about the goals of representation and the allocation of responsibility in legal
decisionmaking and to weigh the relative merits of paternalism and autonomy.
This Article advances in six Parts. The first, this introduction, summarizes
the scope of the article and its key concepts. The second Part, entitled "Lawyers'
Nightmares Do Come True: When the Client Volunteers for Execution," reviews
three seminal Supreme Court cases that established the modern death penalty,
1. ALBERT CAMus, THE MYTH OF SIsYPHUS 3 (Justin O'Brien trans., Vintage Books
1955) (1942).
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describes the swelling ranks of death row in the United States and the
commensurate need for death row representation, addresses the disorienting
ethical universe of the capital volunteer, and analyzes a number of ethical
approaches to lawyering.
The third Part, entitled "Grasping at Straws: Competence As a Means of
Avoiding the Volunteering Conundrum," describes the competence hearing as
an illusory solution to the problem of the volunteer. It outlines the legal
standards of competence, contrasts legal standards against medical standards,
and concludes that competence assessments are ineffectual as checks on the
volunteering client. While competence hearings may prevent the overtly
psychotic defendant from committing state-assisted suicide by volunteering for
execution, they cannot prevent the competent-but-severely-depressed defendant
from doing so. This Part of the Article also analyzes Smith v. State.
2
The fourth Part, entitled "The Ethics of Killing Your Client," suggests that
the ambiguities of the Model Rules allow lawyers to construe their obligations
in whatever manner they wish. Because of these ambiguities, the Model Rules
fail to provide meaningful guidance to the capital attorney. There are also
difficulties in applying abstract Model Rules to concrete facts involving real
clients.
The fifth Part of the Article, entitled "Primum Non Nocere: Reasoning by
Analogy," suggests that some meaningful ethical guidance might be available
from outside the profession. It notes that medical professionals are often
confronted with analogous decisions and concludes that medical ethics may
shed valuable light on legal ethics. This Part of the Article contrasts the roles
of physicians and attorneys, compares terminal illnesses and pending
executions, and concludes that dealing with the volunteering death row client
more resembles physician-assisted suicide than mere withdrawal of treatment.
This Part of the Article also discusses Soering v. United Kingdom,3 describes
the phenomenon of "death row syndrome," and considers the implications of
death row syndrome on a defendant's waiver of appeals.
The sixth Part of the Article, the conclusion, recapitulates the principal
themes of the argument and concludes that the ethical lawyer should refuse to
acquiesce to the volunteering client's wishes, not because the lawyer has
paternalistically substituted his or her judgment for that of the client, but
because it is impossible to distinguish the will of the client from the situational
effects of death row syndrome.
2. Smith v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1264 (Ind. 1997).
3. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
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II. Lawyers' Nightmares Do Come True: When the Client
Volunteers for Execution
About 3500 individuals await execution in America.4 While a handful of
these individuals live in the shadow of federal execution,5 ninety-nine percent
of America's death row inmates face execution by the thirty-eight states that
currently authorize capital punishment.
6
In one sense, it is strange that any of these individuals should live in the
shadow of the gallows. It is strange because, not so very long ago, the United
States was following the same abolitionist trajectory as many other Western
nations.7 Like many nations in Western Europe, the United States had
restricted the use of capital punishment by the turn of the twentieth century;
"the death penalty had become an exceptional punishment[,] ... reserved for
only the most serious of offenses, rarely imposed, and regarded as particularly
problematic. '8 Following the same pattern as many European countries, the
United States seemed to be moving "from sporadic execution to a continuation
of death penalties but without executions to suspension or abolition of the death
penalty."9 Indeed, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the United States appeared
to be on the same course as other countries that abandoned capital punishment
4. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, SPRING 2004
DEATH Row USA 1 (2004), http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/drusa/DRUSA-
Spring_2004.pdf (last visited Oct. 26,2005) [hereinafter DRUSA] (reporting 3487 on death row
as of Apr. 1, 2004).
5. Id. at 31 (reporting that thirty-one inmates are on the federal government's death row
and seven are on the military's death row). Federal executions are, relatively speaking, rare.
See John McCormick, Death Took a Long Holiday, But Feds Are Now Set to Resume
Executions, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 17, 2000, at A23 (outlining long hiatus in federal executions).
There have been only thirty-seven federal executions since 1927. Federal Executions 1927-
2003, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=149 (last visited Oct. 16,
2005). Until recently, the federal government had not executed anyone in decades. Victor
Feguer was executed in May of 1963, but over the subsequent thirty-eight years, there were no
executions. Id. In 2001, however, the federal government resumed executions, putting Timothy
McVeigh to death by lethal injection on June 11. Id. Another federal execution, of Juan Raul
Garza, took place just eight days later and was followed by a third in 2003. Id.
6. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STATE BY STATE INFORMATION, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/state/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2005) (noting that thirty-eight states, the federal
government, and the military authorize capital punishment, while twelve states and the District
of Columbia do not). In 2004, death penalty statutes in New York and Kansas were struck
down as unconstitutional. Id.
7. See FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTONS OF AMERICAN CAPITALPuNISHMENT 18
(2003) (describing the decline of capital punishment in developed nations).
8. Id. at 18.
9. Id. at 24.
SWILLING HEMLOCK
during a brief window of time.10 But while most Western nations have
abolished capital punishment," the United States has retained it. With a trilogy
of seminal Supreme Court cases-McGautha, Furman, and Gregg-the
country has reconfirmed its commitment to capital punishment.
A. Three Cornerstone Cases of American Capital Jurisprudence
In McGautha v. California,12 the Supreme Court rejected the claim that
unfettered jury discretion resulted in arbitrary sentencing, and therefore violated
the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.13 In this six-to-three decision,
the Court concluded that affording a capital jury with untrammeled discretion
to decide issues of life and death did not violate the Constitution. 14 Indeed, the
majority suggested that it was beyond "the present limitations of human
knowledge" to establish any sort of judicial process that could adequately guide
a jury's discretion.' 5
The holding in McGautha, however, was contradicted only fourteen
months later in Furman v. Georgia.16 There the Court held that, as it was being
applied, the death penalty violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 17
Furman is a landmark decision in at least three ways. First, it was a close
decision (five-to-four) in which every member of the Court wrote a separate
opinion. Second, it was a massive decision (both in its impact and its length):
the Furman decision filled 233 pages of the official reports.18 Third, and most
importantly, Furman articulated many of the themes that would dominate
capital jurisprudence for the next thirty years. The Furman dissenters
10. See id. at 6 fig. 1.1 (charting the dramatic decline in executions in the United States
during the 1960s).
11. See id. at 16-38 (tracing abolition trends worldwide); id. at 38-39 (noting that, with
the exception of Japan and the United States, almost all of the First World is now committed to
abolition).
12. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
13. Id. at 196.
14. Id. at 207.
15. Id.
16. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). These antipodal opinions were
issued only 423 days apart. McGautha was decided on May 3, 1971, and Furman was decided
on June 29, 1972.
17. Id. at 239-40.
18. Furman is not the longest opinion issued (it is said that the 300-page opinion in
McConnell v. F.E.C., 540 U.S. 93 (2003), holds that honor), but it is extraordinarily long. The
Furman syllabus begins on page 238 of the official reports, and Justice Rehnquist's dissent ends
on page 470.
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emphasized the long tradition of capital sentencing, 19 noting that the Court had
just reaffirmed the constitutionality of unfettered jury sentencing in
McGautha.20 The Furman plurality, on the other hand, indicated that although
allowing unguided juries to decide between life and death might be consistent
with the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirements, the consequences
of this approach (i.e., capricious and arbitrary sentencing) violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.2 ' In his
concurrence, Justice Stewart claimed that the imposition of capital punishment
was "cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel
and unusual.... [TIhe Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the
infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique
penalty to be so wantonly and freakishly imposed." 22 A truly watershed case,
Furman meant that the death penalty was effectively dead in America.
The American abolition of capital punishment was short-lived, however.
Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia,23 the Court changed course yet again,
concluding that Georgia's new death penalty scheme adequately limited the risk
of arbitrary application. 24 The statute at issue in Gregg overcame Furman's
prohibition by providing both guidance (insuring consistency in application)
and discretion (insuring individualized sentencing) to the jury.25 Gregg also
approved three important procedural reforms: (1) bifurcated trials, with guilt
and sentencing phases,26 (2) automatic appellate review of capital convictions
19. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 407-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that "until today
capital punishment was accepted and assumed as not unconstitutional per se under the Eighth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment").
20. See id. at 408-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe Court [is] evidently persuaded
that somehow the passage of time has taken us to a place of greater maturity and outlook. The
argument, plausible and high-sounding as it may be, is not persuasive, for it is only one year
since McGautha ... ").
21. See id. at 256-58 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that laws that are facially
nondiscriminatory violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if their
application nonetheless results in discrimination).
22. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
23. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
24. See id. at 206-07 (stating that Georgia's legislative guidelines prevent juries from
"wantonly and freakishly impos[ing] the death penalty").
25. See id. at 197-98 ("As a result, while some jury discretion still exists, 'the discretion
to be exercised is controlled by clear and objective standards so as to produce non-
discriminatory application."') (citations omitted).
26. See id. at 195 (stating that the concerns of the Court in Furman are "best met by... a
bifurcated proceeding").
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27and sentences, and (3) proportionality review, allowing courts to compare the
instant case to sentences imposed in comparable cases.28
In the wake of the Court's decision in Gregg, states quickly passed guided
discretion statutes to comply with the Eighth Amendment;29 these revised death
penalty statutes were subsequently upheld as constitutionally permissible.
30
After only four years of their experiment with abolition, state legislatures had
rehabilitated capital punishment in America.
B. Death: A Growth Industry
Today, the American death penalty is alive and well.3 ' In 1973, the year
after capital punishment was struck down in Furman, there were only 134
inmates on death row in the United States.32 By 1977, one year after Gregg
was decided, that figure had jumped to 423. 33 By 1980, it had increased to 691
inmates; by 1990, it had increased exponentially to 2356; and by 2000, it had
ballooned to 3593. 34
As death row continues to swell, the need for capital attorneys
correspondingly increases.35 Not surprisingly, death penalty classes have
27. See id. at 198 (noting that automatic appeals are an "important additional safeguard
against arbitrariness and caprice").
28. See id. at 203 (noting that proportionality review is intended to prevent caprice).
29. See generally James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Matters of Life or Death: The
Sentencing Provisions in Capital Punishment Statutes, 31 CRIM. L. BULL. 19 (1995) (describing
state capital punishment statutes).
30. See, e.g., Robert Woll, The Death Penalty and Federalism: Eighth Amendment
Constraints on the Allocation of State Decisionmaking Power, 35 STAN. L. REv. 787, 787
(1983) (describing the responses of state legislatures to the Supreme Court's death penalty
holdings).
31. While death row continued to increase in size, the number of executions actually
carried out fell in 2004. Bill Mears, Fewer Executions in 2004: Group Opposed to Death
Penalty Finds Five-Year Decline, www.cnn.comI/2004/LAW/12/13/death.penalty/index.html
(Dec. 13, 2004).
32. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., DEATH Row INMATES BY STATE AND SIZE OF DEATH Row




35. The demand for capital representation exceeds the current supply. Mack Reed, An
Even Longer Wait on Death Row, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, available at http://factoid.lavoice.
org/portfolio/writing/death.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2005). Reed identifies several reasons
why lawyers are "not exactly jumping over one another" to become involved in death row
appeals: low pay (California's rate of ninety-five dollars per hour is well below the $110 to
$150 rate paid by the federal government for appeals work, and far below the $200 to $300 rate
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become commonplace in the law school curriculum; death penalty clinics have
become regular fixtures.36 Legal publishers now print death penalty casebooks
and hornbooks, 37 and capital punishment is taught in the same way that torts
and contracts are taught. Death penalty students are carefully trained to identify
and analyze substantive issues, procedural claims, and habeas corpus matters.
Yet even equipped with a flawless education, the fledgling attorneys involved
in death penalty litigation will face profound ethical dilemmas. Capital cases
are, after all, proceedings in which the legal stakes are literally life-and-death.
C. The Looking-Glass Ethics of the Volunteering Client
The most difficult ethical dilemma that faces capital attorneys may be
what to do about the "volunteer, 3 8 the client who wishes to waive his appeals
and to expedite his own execution. 39 The situation is a defense lawyer's
available in private practice), long hours, unpleasant and fruitless work, and "zero prestige." Id.
One attorney suggested, "You're not going to get any accolades-except possibly from some of
your peers-nor any understanding from the public.... If the case becomes a high-profile one, you
will be vilified in every way imaginable. It's a painful and frustrating experience." Id.
36. For examples, see American University's Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project,
http://wcl.american.edu/innocenceproject/ (last visited Oct. 16,2005); California Western School
of Law's California Innocence Project, http://www.cwsl.edu/main/default.asp?nav=icda.
asp&body=icda/innocence.project.asp (last visited Oct. 16, 2005); Cornell Law School's Death
Penalty Project, http://www.lawschool.comell.edu/library/death/ (last visited Oct. 16,2005); Santa
Clara University's Northern California Innocence Project, http://www.scu.edullaw/social
justice/ncipjhome.htnl (last visited Oct. 16, 2005); University of California, Berkeley's Death
Penalty Clinic, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/cenpro/clinical/dpclinic/ (last visited Oct. 16,2005);
University of Wisconsin's Wisconsin Innocence Project, http://www.law.wisc. edu/fjr/innocence/
(last visited Oct. 16, 2005); Yeshiva University's Innocence Project, http://www.innocence
project.org/(last visited Oct. 16, 2005).
37. For examples, see LNDA E. CARTER & ELLEN KREIZBERG, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT LAW (2004); RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMEr AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (2d ed. 2001); BARRY LATzER, DEATH PENALTY CASES (2d ed. 2002); NINA
RIvKIND & STEVEN F. SHATZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEATH PENALTY (2001); VICTOR
STREiB, DEATH PENALTY IN A NUtSHEL (2003).
38. "Volunteer" is the term utilized in the capital defense community, but this may be a
misnomer. See Janill L. Richards, A Lawyer's Ethical Considerations When Her Client Elects
Death: The Model Rules in the Capital Context, 3 SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 127, 154 ("All clients who
seek death are not truly 'volunteers."'); Bryan Robinson, Give Me Death: Rise of 'Volunteer'
Executions May Mean Death Isn't Worst Punishment, ABC News, Jan. 7, 2004 (quoting Diane
Clements, Executive Director of Justice for All, as arguing that "[t]here is no such thing [as a
consensual execution].... [Ilit is a phrase coined by those who would oppose the death penalty....
It's just not true. Why can't death-penalty opponents call it what it is: a prisoner's decision to end
his appellate process?") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
39. I refer to "his" appeals and to "his" execution for parsimony in writing. The gendered
pronoun is warranted in this context: the overwhelming majority of death row inmates are male.
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nightmare, a breakdown in the adversarial system upon which American
criminal law is founded. 4° It disrupts the normal processes of the law and
leaves the defense attorney in an awkward no-man's land, wrestling against a
knot of thorns, unsure of what legal duty ultimately requires.' Michael Mello
describes the situation:
The familiar paradigm is that a lawyer, especially a criminal defense
lawyer, owes an absolute duty of loyalty to his or her client in carrying out
the wishes of that client "zealously," assuming that the wishes are "within
the bounds of the law." However-in the actual law offices and hearts of
actual lawyers representing actual death row prisoners with actual
execution dates-the lawyer's duty of undivided loyalty to the client
becomes far more complicated. Of course, the ultimate duty is to the client.
Yet that loyalty must be balanced against the lawyer's (1) duty to the
integrity of the criminal justice system; (2) duty to other condemned clients
who don't want to volunteer for execution but whose executions might
become more likely if the volunteer for execution gets his way (the ACLU's
position in the Gary Gilmore case); and (3) duty to his or her own
conscience, which may include a moral conviction that capital punishment
is wrong or lawless.42
It presents a Gordian knot. Is it the responsibility of lawyers to serve their
clients' interests to the exclusion of all other considerations?43 Assuming that it
See DRUSA, supra note 4, at I (reporting that as of April 1, 2004,98.5% of America's death row
inmates were male).
40. See Richard C. Dieter, Ethical Choices for Attorneys Whose Clients Elect Execution, 3
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 799, 818 (1990) ("The problem with voluntary executions is that both
parties, the state and the defendant, are seeking the same goal, death of the defendant, and this may
be contrary to higher societal interests.").
41. One attorney described the chaos that ensues when the adversarial system breaks down:
There is suddenly the awful problem of how to feel grounded in your position as the
lawyer. Suddenly you're in a position of being "against" your client and there is no
precedent for that. And the client hates you for it. The judge hates you for it. It's just
a phenomenal and confusing sort of theater that no one is prepared for.... It's a
torturous position to be in because you know that your decisions are coming out of
your own values, and to whatever extent the criminal defense function has some kind
of formal respect in the courtroom suddenly you feel like you have no respected
position at all. You're suddenly in no-man's land and everybody's looking at you like
you're a sleazeball.
C. Lee Harrington, A Community Divided: Defense Attorneys and the Ethics of Death Row
Volunteering, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 849, 876 (2000) (quoting Attorney #8).
42. Michael Mello, Representing Death Row: An ArgumentforAttorney-Assisted Suicide,
34 CRi. L. BuLL. 48, 50 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
43. Model Rule 1.2 notes,
[A] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation.., and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they
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is the duty of lawyers to so serve their clients' interests, what does that mean?
Does that mean that lawyers are required to assist clients affirmatively in
ending their lives, or is terminating appeals not truly in clients' interests?
44
Perhaps lawyers must balance their principal duty to their client against
their collateral duty to challenge the state's conviction with a vigorous appeal,
thereby safeguarding the Eighth Amendment and the integrity of the criminal
justice system.45 Perhaps Mello is correct in claiming that lawyers' consciences
also matter.46 Perhaps, in limited circumstances, good lawyers should
are to be pursued.... In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's
decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to
waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.
MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2004). The client has "ultimate authority to
determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law
and the lawyer's professional obligations." Id. cmt. 1 (2004). Within those limits, the
lawyer must "reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's
objectives are to be accomplished .. " MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2)
(2004).
44. Regardless of how death row lawyers proceed, it is clear that their decisions have
moral consequences. In a different context, Julie Hilden has insisted that "the attorney
should realize that giving legal advice that one knows will be used in a certain way is a
morally freighted act, and that when basic human rights are at stake, the moral import of that
advice is even graver." Julie Hilden, Did a Government Lawyer 'Aid andAbet' Possible War
Crimes?, http://www.cnn.com/2O04/LAW/O6/08/hilden.torture/index.html (Jun. 8, 2004).
She hints that lawyers may bear moral responsibility for the decisions made by counseled
clients: "Lawyers' advice matters: It can make people hesitate, or spur them on." Id.
45. Only in South Carolina are competent defendants free to waive sentence review.
See State v. Torrence, 473 S.E.2d 703, 706 (S.C. 1996) (recognizing that a defendant may
knowingly and voluntarily waive both constitutional and statutory rights, including capital
sentencing review). This suggests that society, as well as the condemned defendant, has an
interest in verifying the legitimacy of all death sentences.
Appellate review is necessary not only to safeguard a defendant's right not to
suffer cruel and unusual punishment but also to protect society's fundamental
interest in ensuring that the coercive power of the State is not employed in a
manner that shocks the community's conscience or undermines the integrity of
our criminal justice system.
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 171-72 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also
Michelle C. Goldbach, Like Oil and Water: Medical and Legal Competency in Capital
Appeal Waivers, 1 CAL. CRIM. L. REv. 2, 6 (noting that a strong need for reliability in the
adjudication of capital cases explains why direct appeals are automatic and non-waivable in
all but one state).
46. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (listing factors to be considered along
with a lawyer's duty to a client). Formal weight may be afforded to the lawyer's conscience.
Model Rule 1.16 permits an attorney to withdraw from representation if "a client insists
upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a
fundamental disagreement." MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2004).
Withdrawal from a capital appeal, however, will not necessarily prevent a client from
volunteering. The defendant may be assigned new counsel, or he could waive subsequent
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substitute their judgment for that of their clients, securing the objectives that
their clients should want.47 These issues cloud the ethics of managing a client
who wants to volunteer, and complicate the lawyer's ethical role in such a
situation.
The death penalty lawyer who seeks guidance in the problem of
volunteering will find no shortage of advice. Indeed, tides of ink have been
spilled on the matter. Unfortunately, there is no clear consensus within the
literature: some jurists argue that the lawyer is ethically bound to honor the
client's wishes, while others insist that the ethical attorney must oppose any act
that increases the likelihood of execution-even the acts of the client.
The dilemma of the volunteering client, however, is no mere theoretical
puzzle for armchair lawyers and legal ethicists. It is a matter of grave practical
concern, and all of the scholarship in the legal databases has not solved the
problem. Ever since Socrates chose to raise the cup of hemlock to his lips
instead of escaping from custody,48 the relationship of the Lawful and the Good
has become clouded within the sphere of capital punishment. The problem is
not one restricted to ancient history: Contemporary volunteering is a worsening
problem.49 In 2004, sixteen percent of the fifty-nine people executed were
volunteers, up from an average of about eleven percent.50
legal representation at the same time he waives his appeals.
47. Some requests cannot be ethically honored. For example, in the military, an order to
kill unarmed civilians is an unlawful order and should be refused, even if issued by a legitimate
authority. See Riggs v. State, 43 Tenn. 85, 86-87 (1866) (stating that an unlawful order, a
command "in its substance being clearly illegal, so that a man of ordinary sense and
understanding would know as soon as he heard the order read or given that such order was
illegal, would afford a private no protection for a crime committed under such order"). The
Model Rules similarly limit the lawyer's behavior. For example, a lawyer cannot knowingly
assist a client in committing a criminal offense. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d)
(2004). There may be analogous circumstances where the lawyer is obligated to refuse the
client's requests. The Model Rules recognize that some clients may not be situated to make
prudent and appropriate decisions, and accordingly afford the attorney increased discretion in
these cases. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2004) (stating rules for the client-
lawyer relationship where the client has a diminished capacity).
48. See PLATO, SOCRATES' DEFENSE (Hugh Tredennick trans.) in THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF PLATO 3, 26 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961) (quoting the volunteer
Socrates as observing, "Now it is time that we were going, I to die and you to live, but which of
us has the happier prospect is unknown to anyone but God").
49. See AMNESTY INT'L, THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL (2001), http://web.amnesty.
org/library/Index/ENGAMR510532001 (last visited Oct. 16, 2005) (reporting that
approximately 12.5% of the executions conducted since the death penalty was reinstated
involved volunteers, and that about two-thirds of these consensual executions had taken place in
the six years prior to 2001).
50. John Cristoffersen, Connecticut Execution Puts the Spotlight on "Death Row
Syndrome," AP Online, Feb. 1, 2005, available at 2/1/05 ASSOCPR 19:11:44 (reporting
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Gary Gilmore, the first individual to be executed after the Supreme Court
reinstated the death penalty, was a volunteer.51 Timothy McVeigh, the first
federal prisoner to be executed in thirty-eight years, was executed after
terminating his appeals. 52 Of the thirty-four jurisdictions that have carried out
executions since Gregg, ten resumed capital punishment by executing a
volunteer, and another four states have executed only volunteers.53 Between
1977 and 1992, there were twenty-two volunteers (among the 188 executions
carried out in America); between 1993 and 2002, there were seventy-five
volunteers (among 632 executions).54 Anecdotal evidence (as well as the scant
empirical evidence available on the subject) suggests that most death row
inmates consider volunteering at least once throughout the course of their
appeals.55 There are many reasons why a volunteer might wish to terminate his
appeals:
[H]e does not want to grow old in prison; because of the dehumanizing
conditions of most death row facilities; because of severe depression or pre-
existing suicidal urges; because of lingering guilt and remorse about the
crime(s) committed; to escape the roller-coaster experience of the habeas
appeals process or to seize control over it; to spare family and friends
ongoing pain; or as a "macho" confrontation with death.56
Mello argues that volunteering for execution may be an act of courage,
valor, or principle.57 He believes that ethical lawyers must respect their
statistics on volunteering).
51. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1014-15 (1976) (finding that Gilmore "made a
knowing and intelligent waiver" of his right to appeal sentencing). See generally MIKAL
GILMORE, SHOT IN THE HEART (1994) (recounting the events surrounding Gary Gilmore's
decision to forego his appeals).
52. See Notice to Court, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68-M (D. Colo. Dec. 7,
2000), available at http://courttv.com/national/oklahoma/mcveigh-121200.html (last visited
Oct. 26, 2005) (stating McVeigh's intent to forego further appeals).
53. The jurisdictions that have resumed executions with volunteers are: Delaware,
Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Nevada, Ohio, Virginia, Utah, Washington, and the federal
government. The jurisdictions that have executed only volunteers are: Idaho, New Mexico,
Oregon, and Pennsylvania. See DRUSA, supra note 4, at 11-30 (providing a chronological
listing of executed defendants and identifying those who were volunteers).
54. Robinson, supra note 38 (citing data obtained from the Death Penalty Information
Center).
55. See Welsh S. White, Defendants Who Elect Execution, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 853,857
(1987) (citing interviews with defense attorneys); Harrington, supra note 41, at 850
("[P]reliminary evidence suggests that the majority [of death row inmates] elect to halt appeals
at some point... though most eventually change their minds.").
56. Harrington, supra note 41, at 850.
57. See Mello, supra note 42, at 57-59 (discussing philosophical discourse on suicide).
SWILLING HEMLOCK
volunteering clients' wishes, and either step aside or affirmatively assist their
clients in obtaining executions.5 What appears to be nobility or courage,
however, might actually be nothing more than a bid for the attorney's time and
attention.59 It may not be conscious, but the client (who has probably been
failed by his family, by institutions, and by his trial lawyers for the whole of his
life) might "test" his appellate counsel by stating his intention to give up his
appeals, to see whether or not his lawyers care enough to fight for him.
60
Ultimately, even the client's intentions may not be what they appear. Indeed, in
the death penalty context, little is ethically certain.
Although the "macabre solution" of defense counsel joining the
prosecution in seeking the defendant's execution has been dismissed as
theoretical poppycock,6' proof that truth is indeed stranger than fiction can be
found in the case of State v. Smith.62 The Smith case inverted traditional
courtroom roles. Arizona prosecutors pleaded with the jury to spare the
defendant's life while defense counsel insisted upon the death penalty.
63
Douglas Alan Smith, on trial for first-degree murder, burglary, and theft,
explained that he would prefer to be executed than to spend the rest of his life
in prison. His attorney, Jamie McAllister, agreed to subordinate her personal
views against the death penalty and to "be a vigorous advocate" on Smith's
behalf.64 The defense community ignited in outrage. Her boss, Phoenix Public
Defender Dean Trebesch, removed McAllister from the case, but she resigned
from the public defender's office and was immediately reappointed as private
counsel to represent Smith.65 Paul Rothstein has suggested:
A defense lawyer in McAllister's position "would be on unassailable
grounds" had she agreed to the death penalty in a case where the
prosecutors sought it. "But she went further than anyone has apparently
58. See id. at 64 ("The question [is] whether an attorney should assist the state in its will
to execute his... client. This question should be answered in the affirmative.").
59. See Harrington, supra note 41, at 850 (citing dehumanizing prison conditions and the
"roller-coaster" appeals process as motivations for volunteering).
60. Id.
61. See David A. Davis, Capital Cases: When the Defendant Wants to Die, 16 CHAMPION
45, 46 (1992) (describing the breakdown of the adversarial system when a defendant volunteers
for the death penalty).
62. Arizona v. Smith, No. CR1995-007070 (Ariz. Super. Ct. filed July 28, 1995). Docket
information is available at http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/criminal/caselnfo.
asp?caseNumber=CR1995-007070 (last visited Oct. 16, 2005).
63. See Mark Hansen, Death's Advocate, 84 A.B.A. J. 22, 22 (Dec. 1998) (describing the
history of the case).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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ever gone before, by affirmatively pressing for a death sentence even the
prosecution didn't want."66
Smith was not sentenced to die. Instead, he was sentenced to sixty-two
years in prison. McAllister, however, vowed to appeal the conviction and the
sentence. She said that she was confident she did the right thing. "What
would bother me more," she said, "would be to see somebody stripped of his
right to make his own decisions about the course of his life. 
67
There is a definite through-the-looking-glass quality to the universe of
capital volunteers. Our expectations about legal roles and duties collapse;
fundamental assumptions about human nature are tested. Legal ethics
become a labyrinth in which one can become disoriented and lost.
Thankfully, at least three situations confronting death row lawyers are
ethically straightforward. First, it is ethically uncomplicated when the client
wants to appeal his conviction and the death row attorney wants to help him
do so. Presumably, this category of cases constitutes the bulk of capital
appeals.
Second, while nightmarish, legal ethics are clear when the client wishes
to appeal his conviction but the attorney intentionally sabotages the client's
case in an effort to insure his execution. In 1998, David Smith, a highly
respected North Carolina attorney with eighteen years of experience as an
Assistant United States Attorney, took on the capital appeal of Russell
Tucker. But when Smith read through the transcripts of Tucker's trial, he
concluded that he "did not like Mr. Tucker" and "decided that Mr. Tucker
deserved to die. He then intentionally missed a deadline for filing an
appeal, effectively condemning his client.69 The situation is horrifying, but
analytically simple: Smith's sabotage of his client not only violates the
American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Rules, 70 but it is analogous to the
71
capital crime of procuring the execution of an innocent person by perjury.
66. Id. (quoting Paul Rothstein).
67. Id.
68. Sara Rimer, Lawyer Sabotaged Case of a Client on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24,
2000, at A37.
69. Id.
70. Smith's behavior violated the Model Rule's standards of Competence (Rule 1.1),
Scope of Representation (Rule 1.2), Diligence (Rule 1.3), and his duty as an Advisor (Rule 2.1).
His behavior violated several provisions of the Model Rule governing Misconduct (Rule 8.4).
See generally STEPHEN Gni ERS & Roy D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS (1999).
71. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 128 (2005) ("Every person who, by willful perjury or
subornation of perjury procures the conviction and execution of any innocent person, is
punishable by death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole."). Tucker was not an
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Third, it is straightforward when a client raises the possibility of
volunteering but is dissuaded by his lawyers. Almost all attorneys agree that it
is ethically permissible to use moral persuasion in counseling a client against
volunteering. Indeed, most attorneys believe the lawyer is not only permitted to
counsel the client against volunteering, but ethically must counsel the client
against it.72 Richard Dieter, for example, claims the capital attorney is bound
by a responsibility to "effective persuasion," of vigorously attempting to
dissuade one's client from volunteering.73 But even persuasion has its limits.74
This raises a series of threshold questions: What, precisely, constitutes
"volunteering"? Is it volunteering when a client jokes about waiving his
appeals? Half-jokes? When a client asks his lawyers if they think it's a good
idea? When a client tells his lawyers that it's what he wants to do, but can be
dissuaded? When a client insists upon it and is resolute? And assuming that
the lawyers do seek to change the mind of the volunteering client, at what point
does persuasion become unethical? When does persuasion blur into
manipulation? 75 When does it become bullying? Are there situations when
"innocent person," and Smith did not affirmatively perjure himself, but Smith's conduct and the
consequences of his omission were analogous.
72. Indeed, much of what a lawyer does is to offer his clients sound, objective advice.
Anthony Kronman argues that the essence of the "good lawyer" is found in offering this kind of
prudent counsel:
[A] lawyer is likely to begin by asking his client if he has thought the matter
through and really wants to do what he now says he does. It may not always be
clear that the client's decision is impetuous, but when surrounding circumstances
suggest that it is, a responsible lawyer will test his client's judgment before
accepting it, recognizing that in such situations the danger of regret is large and that
a lawyer must protect his client from this familiar species of self-inflicted harm as
well as the harms caused by others.
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 129 (1993).
73. Dieter, supra note 40, at 812.
74. Kronman suggests that the good lawyer should never simply substitute his own
judgment for that of his client:
[O]ne thing at least seems clear. It would be inappropriate for the lawyer to
conduct this inquiry [of what is truly in the client's interest] from the perspective of
his own personal desires by asking whether he would want to do what the client has
proposed, and to conclude that the client's decision is impetuous if the lawyer
would not have made it for himself. After all, the client's desires may simply be
different from those of his lawyer, and the fact that they differ in their wants is not
itself a sign that the client is acting in a foolish or self-destructive way.
KRONMAN, supra note 72, at 130. Volunteering objectively seems like a "self-destructive"
decision, but it may paradoxically give a death row inmate the strength to continue living. See
Mello, supra note 42, at 52-59 (describing the comfort of volunteering in light of the moral
terror of being incarcerated on death row).
75. See generally ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCEAND PRACTICE (3d ed. 1993)
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even bullying is warranted? When should the attorneys act paternalistically?
When should the agency of the lawyers' client be subordinated to other, larger
goals?
D. Client- and Cause-Lawyering
Ultimately, the answers to these questions may depend upon what kind of
lawyer the attorney is. In the archetypal client-lawyer situation, a client comes
to a lawyer with a problem (a contract dispute, perhaps) and the lawyer uses her
specialized knowledge to ascertain the best means to realize the client's
objectives. 76 This is a prosaic example of client-centered lawyering. One way
of characterizing client-centered lawyering is to say that it places the autonomy
of the client at the center of the legal transaction. Another, less charitable, way
is to say that it makes the lawyer into a hired gun, a mercenary, and a whore.77
The cause-centered approach to lawyering, on the other hand, attempts to use
the law as an instrument of social justice. Cause-centered lawyers believe that
they are ethically accountable (along with their clients) for the legal ends they
seek.78 A less charitable description of cause-centered lawyering would suggest
(identifying numerous social psychology techniques of use to attorneys, used to shape opinions
and gain compliance over others).
76. This is effectively what is articulated by Model Rule 1.2. See supra note 43
(discussing Model Rule 1.2). Of course, in criminal defense, even non-capital criminal defense,
the lawyer is afforded unusual latitude in securing the client's objectives. See United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 250 (1967) (White, J., whom Harlan, J. and Stewart, J. join, dissenting in
part and concurring in part) (dissenting to the opinion because it produces "a broad
constitutional rule barring use of a wide spectrum of relevant and probative evidence, solely
because a step in its ascertainment or discovery occurs outside the presence of defense
counsel"). Justice White stated:
The State has the obligation to present the evidence. Defense counsel need present
nothing, even if he knows what the truth is. He need not furnish any witnesses to
the police, or reveal any confidences of his client, or furnish any other information
to help the prosecution's case. If he can confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or
make him appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his normal
course....
Id. at 257 (White, J., with whom Harlan, J. and Stewart, J. join, dissenting in part and
concurring in part); see also infra note 86 (describing the very different legal duties of the
prosecutor).
77. Under this view, lawyers are not "morally accountable for decisions they make ... so
long as those decisions do not run afoul of the law or the relevant lawyer code of conduct."
Robert P. Lawry, Damned and Damnable: A Lawyer's Moral Duties with Life on the Line, 29
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1641, 1643 (1996).
78. CAUSELAWYERING: PoLmcAL COMMrrMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 3
(Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
SWILLING HEMLOCK
that it uses clients as pawns, compromising the objectives of the client by
weighing them against collateral objectives. 7
In the capital context, the distinction between cause- and client-centered
lawyering is particularly important. The attorneys who handle death penalty
appeals often hold deep-seated convictions about the impropriety of capital
punishment.80 Many object to the death penalty on moral grounds (maintaining
that it is necessarily immoral to execute a human being); others object on
administrative grounds (arguing that capital punishment is either per se
unconstitutional or unjust in its application). Despite the fact that almost all
death-penalty attorneys are cause lawyers inasmuch as they oppose capital
punishment, capital attorneys disagree on whether the client or the cause should
be paramount in the representation.
One client-centered attorney conceived of his job this way: "If somebody
really wants to volunteer, fighting that sort of runs counter to the idea that the
client should be treated as an autonomous individual because at some point you
would be elevating your own feelings about the death penalty over that person's
autonomy... ,,81 Another client-centered attorney reasoned that "I would
respect [the decision to volunteer] if I thought that somebody really was
competent.... It's a miserable life on death row. If somebody's judgment is
not impaired, if they're competent to make a decision like that, then you really
do have to respect it. 82
Cause-centered attorneys, however, conceive of their responsibilities in a
somewhat different light. One attorney claimed that his job was not to serve
the various legal needs of his client, but to contest "the state's determinations to
carry out executions. ,83 He bluntly stated that his "interest is assisting death
79. See Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, 1307 (1979) (holding that "it is appropriate to
continue the stay of execution pending consideration by the full Court"). The Court stated:
[Such a cause lawyer] inevitably run[s] the risk of making the actual defendant a
pawn to be manipulated on a chessboard larger than his own case. The idea that the
deliberate decision of one under a sentence of death to abandon possible legal
alternatives cannot be a rational decision, regardless of its motive, suggests that the
preservation of one's own life at whatever cost is the summum bonum, a
proposition with respect to which the greatest philosophers and theologians have
not agreed.
Id. at 1312-13.
80. See John R. Mitchell, Comment, Attorneys Representing Death Row Clients: Client
Autonomy over Personal Opinions, 25 CAP. U. L. REv. 643,644 (1996) (discussing the opinion
of capital attorneys in regard to the death penalty).
81. Harrington, supra note 41, at 865 (quoting Attomey #9); cf. supra note 74 (suggesting
that a lawyer should never substitute his own judgment for that of his client).
82. Harrington, supra note 41, at 868 (quoting Attorney #14).
83. Id. at 865 (quoting Attorney #3).
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row inmates who want to stay alive. Inmates who want to die can find other
attorneys. ' 84 Another cause-centered attorney echoed that view:
The machinery that is in place to kill people is actually dishonest and
morally bankrupt. It is not a machine that should be allowed to operate
unchallenged. Even if the machine... has chewed up and spit out my
client's will to live that does not validate what has become the machine's
choice articulated through his mouth, that he be allowed to die....
Therefore it doesn't change my moral duty' to challenge the intellectually
dishonest and morally bankrupt machine.
8
Thus, some cause-centered lawyers have reconceived their roles, viewing
themselves as institutional gadflies. Their duty lies not with the individual
client, but in opposing a death machine that is running amok in America. Some
lawyers of this sort view their role as the counterpart to that of the prosecutor.
Prosecutors, after all, have a special role in the law. Instead of advocating for a
single client, they act on behalf of society, seeking to serve justice.8 6 Similarly,
some cause-centered lawyers do not represent one client's interests against
those of another party (as a defense attorney might advocate against a plaintiff
in a tort matter), but squarely direct their efforts at opposing every action of a
death-seeking prosecutor. This deviates from the vision articulated by the
Model Rules but does establish a kind of adversarial symmetry in the criminal
process.
Rand and Dana Crowley Jack have conceptualized the ethical positions
that lawyers adopt in dealing with moral dilemmas, identifying four different
positions that attorneys assume.87 The first of these positions is squarely client-
84. Id.
85. Harrington, supra note 41, at 869 (quoting Attorney #12).
86. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 89 (1935) (ruling that the misconduct of the
prosecuting attorney was "pronounced and persistent, with a probable cumulative effect upon
the jury which cannot be disregarded as inconsequential"). The Court stated:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done....
He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while
he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction
as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
Id. at 88; see ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-1.2(b), (c) (3d ed. 1993) (stating the
prosecutor is an advocate, but "[t]he duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to
convict").
87. See generally RAND JACK & DANA CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL
DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS (1989).
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centered. They designate this position "Maximum Role Identification" and
suggest that attorneys who take this position experience no moral conflict
because they act completely within the scope of their professional role and feel
no moral accountability for the outcome of their actions.88 The second position
closely resembles the first, although attorneys taking this position are aware of
the disjoint between their personal ethics and their professional obligations.
Jack and Jack designate this position "Subjugation of Personal Morality."89
The third position, "Recognition of Moral Cost," involves the awareness of a
conflict between personal beliefs and professional obligations that the attorney
tries to resolve by balancing legal duty against moral accountability.90 The
fourth of these positions dovetails smoothly with cause-centered lawyering.
Here, lawyers subordinate their professional obligations to their personal
morality. Jack and Jack call this fourth position "Minimum Role
Identification." Different lawyers adopt different ethical positions, for various
reasons.91 These four ethical positions can be graphed against client- and
cause-centered lawyering, indicating whether the ethical position is highly
likely, possible, or highly unlikely in the capital context. These outcomes are
graphed in Table 1, below.
Table 1 indicates that client-centered attorneys are most likely to ignore or
subordinate moral convictions in an effort to "act like a lawyer," serving the
client's interests as long as they are not barred by legal ethics. Cause-centered
attorneys are most likely to subordinate client interests to larger social
objectives. The cause-centered attorney also serves as an advocate, but
advocates for a social group, not an individual client. In practice, it is unusual
to find working capital attorneys who subscribe to either of the extreme views
(maximum or minimum role identification). Instead, most lawyers are painfully
aware of the two competing values of (1) respect for client autonomy, and (2) a
benevolent paternalism. Whether a client-centered attorney or a cause-centered
one, whether a lawyer who subjugates his personal morality or one who
subjugates the client's demands to the greater good, the capital attorney is
forced to make difficult decisions whenever a client decides to volunteer.
92
88. See supra note 77 (discussing the notion of a lawyer as a hired gun).
89. See JACK & JACK, supra note 87, at 99-126 (describing the four different ethical
positions that lawyers may assume when dealing with moral dilemmas).
90. See id. at 99-126 (describing the four different ethical positions that lawyers may
assume when dealing with moral dilemmas).
91. See id. (describing the four different ethical positions that lawyers may assume when
dealing with moral dilemmas).
92. See Harrington, supra note 41, at 861 (quoting Attorney #18 as stating that whenever
the issue of terminating appeals arises, he "just sort of go[es] limp"). To try to manage a client
who has given up emotionally is an additional drain on the already-taxing endeavor of litigating
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Client-Centered Lawyer Cause-Centered Lawyer
Highly likely: client-lawyer does Highly unlikely: cause-lawyer 
feels
Role what client wants without sense of personally accountable 
for legal
Identification ethical responsibility, acts in a ends obtained, cannot act 
in a purely
_purely professional capacity professional capacity
Possible: client-lawyer is aware Possible: cause-lawyer is aware of
of moral consequences of his moral consequences of his actions,
Subjgae actions, but subordinates them to and wishes to achieve social justice
Personal
legal obligations because legal ends, but may be willing to
duty trumps personal moral subordinate personal goals to legal
convictions duty in some cases
Possible: client-lawyer is aware Possible: cause-lawyer is aware of
Recognition of moral consequences of his moral consequences of his actions
of Moral actions and simultaneously aware and simultaneously aware of legal
Cost of legal obligations, and tries to obligations, and tries to balance
balance them them
Minimum Highly unlikely: client-lawyer Highly likely: cause-lawyer does
cannot subordinate the client's what will most help social justiceRole
interest to personal moral interest, ends, subordinates client's interestsIdentification
even if strongly held to serve a greater good
Table 1: Characterization of Types of Lawyering and Ethical Positions in a Capital
Context
III. Grasping at Straws: Competence as a Means ofAvoiding the Volunteering
Conundrum
The ethical implications of a volunteering client are profound. In an attempt to
avoid the ethical morass that attends the volunteer, some lawyers demand a
competency hearing whenever a client seeks to volunteer.9 3 In one sense, it is Catch-
22 logic,94 reasoning that anyone who affirmatively wants to be executed must be
a capital appeal.
93. See Ross E. Eisenberg, The Lawyer's Role When the Defendant Seeks Death, 14 CAP.
DEF. J. 55, 59 (2001) ("The client will be best served by an attorney who initiates a competency
assessment as soon as the client begins to discuss a guilty plea and request the death penalty.").
94. See Mello, supra note 42, at 62 (stating that it is "Catch-22-esque logic that anyone
who wants to be executed (or to commit suicide by other means) must be crazy, and that if he's
crazy he can't be executed"). See generally JOSEPH HELL.ER, CATCH-22 (1955) (explaining that
someone crazy can be excused from combat duty, but that asking to be excused from combat
duty is proof of sanity, precluding any hope of getting out of combat duty). But see Charisse
Jones, Iowa, Ohio Prisons See Inmate Suicide Spike, USA TODAY, Dec. 6,2004, at 1 A (noting
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crazy, and if you're crazy, you can't be executed under the Court's ruling in Ford v.
Wainwright.95 But insisting upon a competency hearing is responsible lawyering. The
hearing is intended to ensure that the defendant is capable of making intelligent and
knowing decisions.96 Unfortunately for ethically troubled attorneys, however, the legal
threshold for establishing competence is quite low and easily satisfied.
97
Furthermore, many attorneys play fast and loose with definitions ofcompetence.
They do not employ a formalistic legal standard in thinking about whether their clients
are competent; instead, they conceive of competence as a mental health question.
They think holistically about the circumstances under which their clients are
laboring.98 One attorney expressed a commonly held view when he made the
following observation:
People on death row are not in an ideal position for making tough emotional, moral
decisions. A lot of them are cognitively limited. They're either mentally retarded
or they have very low intelligence. Many of them are brain damaged. Some of
them are mentally ill. Some were juvenile when they got to death row and they've
never had any opportunity to mature .... Then you add to that the fact that they're
living in an environment where they don't get sufficient rest, they're not well fed,
their health isn't well taken care of and they're treated like animals.... None of
those people are in a position to make a reasoned, difficult decision of the
magnitude of "I am going to give up my life."9
Whether it is conscious or not, treating competence as a medical question rather
than a purely legal one probably allows some lawyers to substitute theirjudgment for
that of their client, and to be a more zealous advocate in opposing the death penalty.
Other attorneys emphasize the autonomy of the client and acquiesce to the client's
wishes. These attorneys probably adhere to a strict legal standard in thinking about
competence and, whether consciously or not, put personal concerns about the
competence threshold (and the death penalty in general) out of their minds. This
that "[t]here is a connection between mental illness and suicide, but it's a misnomer to believe
that you have to be mentally ill to kill yourself').
95. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417 (1986) (prohibiting execution of the
insane).
96. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 392 (1993) (employing the language of
"intelligently and knowingly" in articulating the standard of competence).
97. In Godinez, the Supreme Court asked "whether the competency standard for pleading
guilty or waiving the right to counsel [volunteering] is higher than the competency standard for
standing trial." Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas concluded that "it is not." Id. at 391.
98. Many attorneys believe that a decision to volunteer can never be rational. Others
believe that it is possible (such as in the case of a Socrates or a John Brown) but have never seen
such a client. See, e.g., supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing the competency of
someone on death row to make the decision to volunteer). A minority of capital defense
attorneys believe that the legal standard is sufficient.
99. Harrington, supra note 41, at 867 n.24 (quoting Attorney #6).
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probably allows them to be more effective in serving as the client's agent
and permits them to simultaneously do their job without torturing
themselves psychologically or harming themselves professionally. 1° But
neither the client-centered autonomist nor the cause-centered paternalist
can ever completely avoid these questions.
A. Clearing the Dusky-Rees Hurdle
In Dusky v. United States,101 the Supreme Court held that the standard
of competence was whether the defendant had "sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him."' 0 2  In the context of
volunteering, the controlling case is Rees v. Peyton,10 3 which follows Dusky
in holding that the appropriate test is whether a defendant has "capacity to
appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to
continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he
is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may
substantially affect his capacity."'10 4 The Dusky and Rees standards are low
thresholds for a defendant to clear. Even Colin Ferguson, who represented
himself at trial by spewing rambling conspiracy theories and engaging in
surreal cross-examination of his victims, was found competent. 10 5 One
100. Lawyers who acquiesce to a volunteer's wishes may be stigmatized. See Robert
Anthony Phillips, Volunteering for Death: The Fast Track to the Death House, CRIME
MAGAZINE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME, available at http://crimemagazine.com/deathrow
volunteers.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2005) ("[Wlhen a criminal defense lawyer decides to help an
admitted killer die, he can become a pariah in the defense community."). The decision can also
entail professional risk. See infra note 440 (discussing a federal judge's threat to revoke an
attorney's license). One attorney described what happened when he cooperated with his client
in waiving appeals:
I made an agreement [with my client to not pursue appeals], and I feel like at the
time it was the only thing I could have done.... but I've been criticized for it. And
the criticism came from within the death penalty community. It came from people I
admire very much. It was hard to take.
Harrington, supra note 41, at 877 (quoting Attorney #11).
101. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
102. Id.
103. Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966).
104. Id. at 314. It has been claimed that the second prong of the Rees test, the
determination of whether a defendant suffers from a mental disease, disorder, or defect that
affects his capacity, has "largely disappeared" in practice. Goldbach, supra note 45, 77.
105. See Lewis Grossberger, Spring Unsprung, MEDIAwEEK, Mar. 27, 1995, at 46
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reporter characterized the Dusky and Rees standards by asserting that "short
of severe mental instability or sheer idiocy," the defendant is found
competent. 106 Like the M'Naughten test for insanity, 107 the Dusky and Rees
standards are legal ones, not medical ones. 0 8 Like the M'Naughten test,
the Dusky and Rees tests consider the defendant's state of mind, but they
are cognitive-not affective-in nature. 1°9  They focus upon what adefendant knows, not on what he feels." 0 Thus, under the standards of
(discussing "shocking murder-shooting" cases); Carolyn McCarthy, Order in the Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1998, at A21 (discussing the trial in which Colin Ferguson chose to defend
himself).
106. Jon Bonnd, A Question of Competency, http://courttv.com/trials/unabomber/
competency.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2005). The Dusky standard is actually more rigorous than
the one that preceded it, which required only that "the defendant [is] oriented to time and place
and [has] some recollection of events." Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
107. See generally NORMAN J. FINKEL, INSANITY ON TRIAL (1988) (discussing the
M'Naughten test). Finkel stated:
To establish a defense on the ground of insanity it must be clearly proved that, at
the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect
of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act
he was doing, or [if] he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong.
Id. at21.
108. Goldbach, supra note 45, 60. Goldbach stated:
[L]egal competency is a determination that focuses on whether a defendant can
meet a certain legal standard... without inquiring whether the defendant is
incapable, due to some mental disorder or defect, of truly meeting that standard...
[while medical competency] takes into consideration a defendant's mental status
and assesses the effect any disorder or disease may have on the defendant's
decisionmaking process.
Id.
109. See FINKEL, supra note 107, at 26-29 (discussing the "cognitively tilted" nature of the
M'Naughten test and asking whether emotional knowledge should play a role in the analysis);
see also RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., A CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE: THE TRIAL OF
JOHN W. HINKLEY, JR. 12 (2d ed. 2000) (exploring the cognitive nature of M'Naughten's
"know" requirement).
110. Or does not feel. Individuals who suffer from "Anti-Social Personality Disorder" (a
diagnosis previously characterized as sociopathy or psychopathy) do not suffer cognitive
deficits, but lack empathy. AM. PSYCHATRIc ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 701-706 (4th ed., text revision 2000). See generally HERVEY CLECKLEY,
THE MASK OF SANITY (5th ed. 1976); RICHARD D. HARE, PSYCHOPATHY: THEORY AND RESEARCH
(1970). One researcher characterizes the "core features" of psychopathy as "lack of real affect,
an inability to relate feelings to the words with which they are expressed, and the chaos and
destruction that the essential psychopath leaves behind." HERSCHEL PRINS, DANGEROUS
BEHAVIOUR, THE LAW, AND MENTAL DISORDER 155 (1986). The individual suffering from
antisocial personality disorder would typically pass a legal test for competence, yet would be
viewed as severely mentally disturbed from a psychiatric standpoint. Thus, while the
psychopath's personality disorder will not shield him from trial (i.e., he is still competent), the
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Dusky and Rees, it is entirely possible for a clinically depressed but non-
psychotic defendant to waive his appeals and to volunteer for execution.
B. Depression and Death Row: The Psychology of Hopelessness
There is a substantial body of research linking imprisonment to
psychological disturbance."' It is unknown whether this is because the
mentally ill are more likely to be arrested or convicted,1 2 or rather more
ominously, because prisons somehow exacerbate or precipitate mental
illness in otherwise healthy individuals."13 But there is no doubt that rates
of mental disorder are disproportionately high in incarcerated populations.
Human Rights Watch has concluded that there are three times more
mentally ill people in prison than in mental health hospitals, 4 that
prisoners have rates of mental illness two to four times greater than the
rates found in the general population, 1 5 and that one in six American
prisoners is mentally ill." 6 In reality, the rate may be even higher. A report
by the American Psychiatric Association estimated that as many as one in
five prisoners are seriously mentally ill, with up to five percent actively
psychotic at any given moment." 7 In 2002, the National Commission on
disorder may nonetheless increase the likelihood of his execution in those jurisdictions that ask
juries to base their decisions upon the risk of future dangerousness. See Ron Rosenbaum,
Travels with Dr. Death, VANITY FAIR, May 1990, reprinted in RvKIND & SHATZ, supra note 37,
at 469 (detailing the psychiatric testimony of Dr. James Grigson in capital cases, and the effect
of that testimony on Texas jurors).
111. See generally L.H. Bukstel & P.R. Kilman, Psychological Effects of Imprisonment on
Confined Individuals, 88 PSYcH. BuLL. 469 (1980) (linking imprisonment with mental
disorders); F.J. Porporino & E. Zamble, Coping with Imprisonment, 26 CANADIAN J. OF
CRIMINOLOGY 403 (1984) (same).
112. See L.A. Teplin, Criminalizing Mental Disorder: The Comparative Arrest Rate of the
Mentally Ill, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 794, 798-801 (1984) (reporting that individuals with mental
disorder are significantly more likely to be arrested than those without mental disorder).
113. See J.S. Wormith, The Controversy Over the Effects of Long-Term Incarceration, 26
CANADIAN J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 423, 434-35 (1984) (describing literature linking prison
conditions to elevated rates of psychiatric disorder); see also J.C. Oleson, The Punitive Coma,
90 CAL. L. REV. 829, 851-52 (2002) (same).
114. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL
ILLNESS 1 (2003).
115. Id.
116. Human Rights Watch, U.S: Mentally Ill Mistreated in Prison, http://www.hrw.org/
press/2003/10/us102203.htm (Oct. 22, 2003).
117. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES IN JAILS AND PRISONS xix (2d ed.
2000).
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Correctional Health Care provided Congress with a chilling report of
prevalence rates:
On any given day, between 2.3 and 3.9 percent of inmates in State
prisons are estimated to have schizophrenia or other psychotic
disorder, between 13.1 and 18.6 percent major depression, and between
2.1 and 4.3 percent bipolar disorder (manic episode). A substantial
percentage of inmates exhibit symptoms of other disorders as well,
including between 8.4 and 13.4 percent with dysthymia, between 22.0
and 30.1 percent with an anxiety disorder, and between 6.2 and 11.7
percent with post-traumatic stress disorder.
118
Many forms of mental disturbance appear to be overrepresented in prison
populations, but a number of studies have found that depression is the most
common of these."19 The relationship between depression and death row is
complicated. Gunn and his colleagues have noted that:
[I]t is very difficult to establish ... whether a depressed murderer is
depressed because he has been imprisoned for life, depressed because
of the conditions in which he is imprisoned, depressed by the enormity
of his crime, or whether he committed murder because he was
depressed in the first place. 1
20
118. 1 NAT'L COMM'N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, THE HEALTH STATUS OF SOON-TO-BE-
RELEASED INMATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 25 (2002), available at http://www.
ncchc.org/stbr/Volumel/Health%20Status%20(vol%201).pdf. The quoted 13.1% to 18.6%
prevalence rate of major depression among prisoners is particularly sobering when one
considers that major depression is twice as common among women (6.5%) than among men
(3.3%). NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., THE NUMBERS COUNT (NIH PUB. No. 01-4584,2001), http://www.mental-health-
matters.com/articles/article.php?artID=335 (citing an unpublished NIMH table). Ninety-three
percent of prisoners under state and federal supervision are male. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE at tbl.6.28 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire, eds.), at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebooklpdf/t6282004.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2005) [hereinafter
SOURCEBOOK]. Such an elevated prevalence rate in such an overwhelmingly male population
suggests that there is some link between mental illness and incarceration.
119. See, e.g., JOHN GUNN ET AL., PSYCHIATRIC ASPECTS OF IMPRISONMENT 219-29 (1978)
(concluding that half of the thirty-four percent of the sample who were classified as suffering
from moderate, marked, or severe psychiatric disturbance suffered from depression); HERSCHEL
PRINS, OFFENDERS, DEvIANTS, OR PATIENTS? AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF SOCIO-
FORENSIC PROBLEMS 45 tbl.3(1), 55 (1980) (noting that cases of reported psychosis, ranging
between 0.5% and 26% prevalence rates, consisted principally of schizophrenia and
depression); P.J. Taylor, Psychiatric Disorder in London's Life-Sentenced Offenders, 26
BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 63, 69-70 (1986) (stating that more than two-thirds of those facing life
sentences appeared to have some form of mental disorder, and that depression and personality
disorders were the principal problems in the sample).
120. GUNNETAL., supra note l19, at35.
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Other reasons may include feelings of futility and inevitability,
isolation from family and friends, contempt for other death row inmates, or
the inability to endure the "roller-coaster" of the habeas appeals process. 21
The utter powerlessness of the death row inmate to alter his fate may also
foster depression. Psychologist Martin Seligman has proposed a model of
human depression based upon what he calls "learned helplessness."'
' 22
Based on his research with classical conditioning, Seligman believes that
some people "learn" that whatever they do is futile and suggests that
learned helplessness is the causal mechanism of human depression. 1
23
For prisoners who have been condemned to death, who pass their
waiting hours in cramped death row cells, 124 oscillating between ennui and
terror, 12 everything is futile: they have nothing but longshot dreams of
clemency126 and an eventual execution at the hands of the state. Frankly, it
is astonishing that more capital defendants do not suffer from clinical
depression.
What does constitute clinical depression? How does clinical
depression differ from more prosaic forms of sadness, sorrow, and
despondency? Table 2 lists the criteria for major depressive episode
according to the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR).
127
121. See Harrington, supra note 56 and accompanying text (quoting Harrington, supra note
41, at 850) (describing various reasons a defendant might wish to waive appeals and volunteer
for execution-most of these reasons could also contribute to depression).
122. See generally Martin E.P. Seligman, Learned Helplessness, 23 ANN. REV. MED. 407
(1972) (describing model of learned helplessness).
123. See id. at 411 (speculating as to the relationship between learned helplessness in
animals and maladaptive behaviors in humans).
124. See infra notes 333-42 and accompanying text (describing conditions of confinement
on death row).
125. See Mello, supra note 42, at 55-56 (describing the uncertainty resulting from "the
monotony and boredom, punctuated only by the sheer terror of having their death warrants
signed and an execution date and time set, only to win an eleventh-hour stay from the courts,
another few years of waiting, then another warrant, and so on").
126. See infra note 309 (noting that on average only one sentence per year is commuted in
the United States).
127. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASs'N, supra note 110, at 356.
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A. Five or more of the following symptoms have been present during the same 2-week
period and represent a change from previous functioning; at least one of the symptoms is
either (1) depressed mood or (2) loss of interest or pleasure.
Note: Do not include symptoms that are clearly due to a general medical condition, or
mood-incongruent delusions or hallucinations.
(1) depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by either
subjective report (e.g., feels sad or empty) or observation made by others (e.g.,
appears tearful). Note: in children and adolescents, can be irritable mood.
(2) markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most of the
day, nearly every day (as indicated by either subjective account or observation
made by others)
(3) significant weight loss when not dieting or weight gain (e.g., a change of more
than 5% of body weight in a month), or decrease or increase in appetite nearly
every day. Note: In children, consider failure to make expected weight gains.
(4) insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day
(5) psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every day (observable by others, not
merely subjective feelings of restlessness or being slowed down)
(6) fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day
(7) feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt (which may be
delusional) nearly every day (not merely self-reproach or guilt about being sick)
(8) diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every day
(either by subjective account or as observed by others)
(9) recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of dying), recurrent suicidal ideation
without a specific plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for committing
suicide
B. The symptoms do not meet criteria for a Mixed Episode (see p. 365).
C. The symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational,
or other important areas of functioning.
D. The symptoms are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug
of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., hypothyroidism).
E. The symptoms are not better accounted for by Bereavement, i.e., after the loss of a loved
one, the symptoms persist for longer than 2 months or are characterized by marked
functional impairment, morbid preoccupation with worthlessness, suicidal ideation,
psychotic symptoms, or psychomotor retardation.
Table 2: Diagnostic Criteria for Major Depressive Episode (from DSM-IV-TR)
The DSM checklist is the industry standard, but it presents the reader with
a dry and desiccated view of major depression. Far more visceral, more
tangible descriptions of depression can be found in the writings of those who
have suffered from mood disorders. 28 In The Crack-Up, novelist F. Scott
Fitzgerald described his disorder in very human terms:
128. See generally KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, ToucHED wrm FIRE (1993) (tracing a long line
of mood disorders among well-known writers).
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I saw that for a long time I had not liked people and things, but only
followed the rickety old pretense of liking. I saw that even my love for
those closest to me was become only an attempt to love, that my casual
relations-with an editor, a tobacco seller, the child of a friend, were only
what I remembered I should do, from other days. All in the same month I
became bitter about such things as the sound of the radio, the
advertisements in magazines, the screech of tracks, the dead silence of the
country-contemptuous at human softness, immediately (if secretively)
quarrelsome toward hardness-hating the night when I couldn't sleep and
hating the day because it went toward night. 29
In Darkness Visible, novelist William Styron described the difficulty in finding
words to convey a sense of depression:
For myself, the pain is most closely connected to drowning or suffocation-
but even these images are off the mark. William James, who battled
depression for many years, gave up the search for an adequate portrayal,
implying its near-impossibility when he wrote in The Varieties of Religious
Experience: "It is a positive and active anguish, a sort of psychical
neuralgia wholly unknown to normal life."
1 30
A potentially crippling disorder, major depression affects approximately
one in twenty Americans in any given year. 3 1 Even for those who enjoy
nurturing relationships, social support networks, and who have access to
antidepressant medication and counseling, depression can be devastating.
132
What about depressed individuals in prison, who lack such resources? 133 What
happens when a competent-but-clinically-depressed defendant is placed on
death row? Is it even possible to distinguish between clinical depression and
the effects of being on death row? And what happens when the suicidal death
row inmate is afforded ample opportunity to take his own life, at government
expense? The case of Smith v. State134 provides one answer to these hard
questions.
129. F. ScoTr FITZGERALD, THE CRACK-UP 72 (Edmund Wilson ed., 1996).
130. WILLIAM STYRON, DARKNESS VISIBLE: A MEMOIR OF MADNESS 17 (1990).
131. See Darrel A. Regier et al., The de Facto Mental and Addictive Disorders Service
System. Epidemiologic Catchment Area Prospective 1- Year Prevalence Rates of Disorders and
Services, 50 ARCIVES OFGEN. PsYCHIATRY 85, 88 tbl. 1 (1993) (noting that, of persons eighteen
years and older, approximately five percent have unipolar major depression).
132. See, e.g., ANDREW SOLOMON, THE NOONDAY DEMON: AN ATLAS OF DEPRESSION
passim (2001) (describing effects of depression).
133. See supra notes 118-19 (describing rates of depression among prison populations).
134. Smith v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1264 (Ind. 1997).
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C. Case Study: Smith v. State
In 1995, Robert Smith was serving a thirty-eight-year sentence for battery
in Indiana's Wabash Valley Correctional Institution.' 35 On June 30th of that
year, Smith and another Wabash inmate (Ronald Lunsford) attacked a fellow
inmate named Michael Wedmore (who was serving a sixty-year sentence for
the murder of his girlfriend's two-year-old daughter).1 36 Using a sharpened
putty knife and a blade from a pair of scissors, Smith and Lunsford stabbed
Wedmore thirty-seven times, including two fatal wounds (one from each
weapon) that pierced Wedmore's heart. 137  When correctional officers
intervened, Smith and Lunsford immediately surrendered and handed over their
improvised weapons.
138
Smith was charged with murder and conspiracy to commit murder. After
the initial hearing, Smith mailed a letter to a local newspaper, the Sullivan
Daily Times. In his letter, he expressed his willingness to volunteer for the
death penalty.
Editor,
I'm one of the men charged with the murder at [the Wabash Valley
Correctional Facility] i understand the county is having aruff time figuring out
where there gonna get the money to take this case to trial, they don't have to
on my account if they file the death penalty on me i will pled guilty & wont
appeal, if by chance they take the case to trial & find me guilty & give me 50
or 60 more years, if they do that it would be awaste of taxpayers money, my
earliest out date in Indiana is 2028, then i have a 15 year parole hold to do in
Michigan. i'm 45 years old. as it stands right now ill be in my 90s when i get
out. 50-60 more years would be-meaning-less, aslap on the hand, a Joke.
Let me tell you just where im coming from if they dont give me the death
penalty for the murder of the Baby Killer the next one to die will be a tax
payer-The only taxpayers in here "work here". I don't say things i don't
mean. Robert A Smith # 30636[.]
139
After the prosecutor requested the death penalty, two attorneys were hired
on Smith's behalf: Smock and Etling. 140 At a pretrial hearing, over the protests
135. Indiana Death Row, Smith, Robert A. #86, http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/htmI
death/row/smithr.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2005).
136. Id.
137. Smith, 686 N.E.2d at 1265.
138. Indiana Death Row, Smith, Robert A. #86, supra note 135.
139. Smith, 686 N.E.2d at 1265-66 (capitalization, spelling, and punctuation in the
original).
140. Id. at 1266.
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of Smock and Etling, Smith agreed to plead guilty, but only if the State would
give him the death penalty. 1
41
The State submitted a written agreement, which stated that Smith would
plead guilty to murder in exchange for the State's recommending the death
penalty and dropping the conspiracy charge. 142 The judge thoroughly questioned
Smith about his signature on the agreement, his mental capacity, and his
understanding of the rights he would waive by pleading guilty. The judge
concluded that Smith's waiver was knowing and voluntary.
143
Soon thereafter, a competency hearing was held. 144 Dr. Wooden, a
clinical psychologist who had been meeting with Smith for several months,
"testified that Smith was suffering from severe depression which caused him to
be incompetent to stand trial or make rational decisions regarding his
defense. 145 Wooden stated that Smith's depression stemmed from being
housed in solitary confinement for the nine months since the killing, and that
Smith would change his mind about pursuing the death penalty if he could be
moved out of solitary.146 Accordingly, Dr. Wooden concluded that Smith was
incompetent to waive his appellate rights. 147 At the close of the hearing, Smith
requested permission to speak, and the court granted his request.
48
Smith's comments say a great deal about the conditions of death row,
about the link between depression and death row volunteering, and about how
difficult it can be to disentangle the effects of clinical depression from the
effects of incarceration. Smith told the court:
I know what I'm doing, you know. I'm fully aware, you know. This is one
of the tests they gave me here. I want to read it to the court here, some of
the questions on here, and this is how they say I'm extremely depressed,
you know. I mean, I'm in prison. Everybody in prison is depressed, you
know.... I'm tired of being in prison, you know, and I'm at the point now
where life doesn't have a whole lot of meaning for me and-you know,
these are some of the questions that they-Question One, ["]I feel
141. See id. (stating that Smith warned the court that if it did not give him the death
penalty, he would kill again, and this time it would not be a fellow inmate that died, but a
correctional officer). He continued: "If [the prosecutor] doesn't do it I'm telling the Court that
the next person that I go at won't be a baby killer, it will be a state employee and I will butcher
him. It will be a massacre. I'll butcher the son-of-a-bitch." Id. at 1267.
142. Id. at 1267.
143. Id.




148. Id. at 1268.
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downhearted, blue, and sad.["] It says ["]none or little of the time, some of
the time, a good part of the time, more or all of the time.["] I mean, how
would anybody in prison answer that question? All of the time.
149
Robert Smith's withering sarcasm underscores an important question.
How can a psychological instrument that was designed to measure mood
disorders among a noncustodial population measure depression on death row?
How can the test distinguish between clinical depression and results that
resemble depression, but are nothing more than the artifact of answering while
incarcerated on death row? 150 Smith's continuing testimony emphasizes the
point:
The second question is, ["]Morning is when I feel the best.["] You know, I
don't feel good any of the time, you know. I'm miserable. You know, my
life is miserable. It's a miserable existence.... Any normal man that's in
prison, you know, is, you know, going to feel downhearted, blue, or sad,
you know. I mean, I don't see anybody running around the prison smiling
and laughing, you know. I mean, it don't happen.... ["]My mind is as
clear as it used to be.["] My mind is probably more clear now that it's ever
been.... ["]I feel hopeful about the future.["] I don't have a future, you
know. I mean, if I don't get the death sentence, I still don't have a future.
What I've got is a slow death. 5 '
Smith was then examined by two additional psychologists, Doctors Singh and
Murphy, who testified that Smith was depressed-but-competent. 152 Dr. Murphy
agreed with Dr. Wooden that Smith's decision to seek the death penalty was
motivated in part by the isolation of solitary confinement, but he felt that
Smith's willingness to abandon the death penalty if transferred out of solitary
was proof of competence, not incompetence. 153
The court then concluded that Smith was competent, accepted the plea
agreement and found him guilty of murder.154 At the sentencing hearing, Smith
did not offer any mitigating evidence. Instead, he provided a letter:
149. Id.
150. Others have noted that standard personality inventories are inappropriate for assessing
mental disorder in prison. Responses that are perfectly normal in the prison context register as
"abnormal" on objective indices because the test is administered under such not-normal
circumstances. "There's not much point in asking a man who's been inside for ten years and
faces another twenty, whether or not he can 'easily get some life into a rather dull party' (to
quote item 51 of the widely used Eysenck Personality Inventory)." STANLEY COHEN & LAURIE
TAYLOR, PSYCHOLOGICAL SURVIVAL: THE EXPERIENCE OFLONG TERM IMPRISONMENT 35 (1972).
151. Smith, 686 N.E.2d at 1268.
152. See id. at 1268-69 (stating that the two court appointed experts found Smith
depressed but competent).
153. Id. at 1269.
154. Id.
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I Robert A. Smith on June 30, 1995, lured Michael Wedmore to a cell i
was being housed in at the Walbash Corr. Inst with the intent of Killing
him. I'm proud to say it is the only thing i ever did in my life that
turned out as planned although it could of been carryed out a bit more
proficient im very satisfied with the results. i'm asking the court to let
justice be served & carry out the sentence. Very Truly yours, Robert
A. Smith[. 
155
The court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Smith to death on
July 12, 1996.156 His death sentence was affirmed five-to-zero by the
Supreme Court of Indiana on October 23, 1997, and Robert Smith was
executed by lethal injection on January 29, 1998, at 12:27 a.m., Eastern
Standard Time. 157
This Part of the Article has suggested that a competence hearing might
seem like a promising avenue out of an ethical labyrinth of wrong turns and
bad directions, but has shown that a competence hearing is unlikely to
resolve the dilemma of the volunteering capital client. As long as the
defendant is capable of working with his lawyers and has a fundamental
grasp of what is happening in the courtroom, he-like Robert Smith-is
free to plead guilty, to waive counsel, and to waive his appeals. Thus, the
oasis of resolution proves to be a mirage. Perhaps meaningful guidance
can be found in the Model Rules that govern the legal profession.
IV. The Ethics of Killing Your Client
The Model Rules of the ABA serve as the ethical standard upon which
most state professional codes are founded. 158 They articulate the "shall"
and the "shall-not" of practicing law in the United States and are a useful
guide in navigating many ethical labyrinths. Unfortunately, however, there
is little useful content in the Model Rules for the attorney who wishes to
know what to do when a death row client wants to volunteer. Indeed, the
Model Rules are silent on the subject of volunteering and are effectively
useless in resolving the attendant ethical dilemmas.
155. Id. at 1270 (capitalization, spelling, and punctuation in the original).
156. Id. at 1269.
157. Indiana Death Row, Smith, Robert A. #86, supra note 135.
158. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 70, at xix ("As of fall 1997, about 41 states and the
District of Columbia had adopted all or significant portions of the Model Rules, and several
others were in the process of doing so.").
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A. The Uselessness of the Model Rules
Under the Model Rules, the criminal defense attorney is generally required
to abide by the client's wishes. The Model Code indicates that "a lawyer shall
abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation,"'
159
and states that a lawyer may not intentionally "[flail to seek the lawful
objectives of his client through reasonably available means." 160 Furthermore,
according to the ABA, "the lawyer should always remember that the decision
whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of non-legal
factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself.' 61 The Model Rules,
however, "do not specifically identify the decision whether to oppose the death
penalty as one of those [situations] in which the defendant has ultimate
authority." 162 And, of course, under Model Rule 1.14, an attorney may assume
more responsibility for decision making when his client functions under a
disability. 163 The Model Rules are not constrained by a rigid Rees standard;
they acknowledge "intermediate degrees of competence."' 164 Thus, an attorney
who pursues appeals, even when he does so against his client's wishes, has a
justifiable ethical foundation. 165 It seems that, in legal ethics, as in the
jurisprudence of capital punishment generally, "death is different." 1
66
It is one thing to articulate an abstract principle such as, "an attorney may
assume additional decisionmaking responsibility when the client labors under a
disability," 167 but it is an altogether different matter to try to implement such a
principle. Just operationalizing the term is difficult. What qualifies as a
159. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1999).
160. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBmrY DR 7-101 (a)(1) (1980).
161. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980). In the event that the client
insists upon a course of action that is contrary to the judgment of the lawyer but not prohibited
by disciplinary rules, the attorney is permitted to withdraw from representation. Id.
162. White, supra note 55, at 856.
163. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUcr R. 1.14 (1999) (stating that when an attorney
has a disabled client, the attorney shall make reasonable attempts to maintain a client-lawyer
relationship and the attorney may seek to appoint a guardian or take additional protective
action).
164. Id. cmt. 1.
165. See Dieter, supra note 40, at 818 (noting the competing interests associated with the
uniqueness of the death penalty).
166. See Jeffrey Abramson, Death-is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital
Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 117 (2004) (identifying a long and distinguished line of capital
cases articulating the "death-is-different" principle); ABA Standard 4-1.2 (1993) ("Since the
death penalty differs in its finality, defense counsel in a capital case should respond to this
difference by making extraordinary efforts on behalf of the accused.").
167. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.14(1999).
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"disability"? 68  What factors can capital lawyers consider in deciding to
substitute their judgment for that of disabled clients? Dementia and delirium
seem straightforward enough, but what about stress? Depression? Anxiety?
What about low IQ scores or a history of child abuse or economic deprivation?
What about intermittent conditions, such as episodic hallucinations punctuated
by long periods of lucidity? What about situational disability? What about the
boredom and terror inherent in the death row experience? 69 Might even that be
per se disabling?
170
Other questions make the implementation of Model Rule 1.14
problematic. How disabled do death row clients have to be before lawyers are
permitted to substitute their judgment? Does any imperfection, however
modest, warrant a lawyer's paternalism? Presumably, the lawyer would be
acting ethically if she assumed additional decisionmaking responsibility for a
mentally retarded (IQ of seventy or less) client. But what about the lawyer who
assumes responsibility for the client who is dull-but-not-retarded (an IQ score
of seventy-five)? Or the lawyer who assumes responsibility for the client with
an average IQ (100), simply because the lawyer has a Mensa-level IQ score? Is
this ethical conduct?
Once the lawyer has determined that the client does suffer from some
measure of a disability, how expansive can a lawyer's assumption of
responsibility be? Assume the death row client suffers from a modest (5%)
disability: Is it unethical for a lawyer to assume 6% of the decisionmaking
responsibility? 10%? 50%? 100%?
The difficulties of implementing the Model Rules are not limited to line-
drawing exercises (e.g., deciding whether the client is disabled or not) and
judgment calls (e.g., deciding whether X amount of disability warrants Y
amount of paternalism). Even the fundamental decision of whether or not to
look for disability is problematic. A lawyer who wants to leave decisionmaking
168. The comment to Rule 1.14 does not define disability. It notes that "to an increasing
extent the law recognizes intermediate degrees of competence" but does not indicate whether
these intermediate degrees of competence are strictly legal in nature (reflecting the client's
cognitive abilities) or whether they may include elements of clinical competence (reflecting the
client's affective and emotional states, as well). See supra note 108 (distinguishing legal
competence from clinical competence).
169. See supra note 125 (noting the monotony, boredom, and terror of death row).
170. See Phillips, supra note 100 (quoting Julie Hall, an Arizona lawyer, who stated that
on death row "[p]eople are being put in long-term solitary confinement that the human mind is
not wired to survive[,]" and that she "has yet to see a case where the inmate seeking death has
been competent to make that decision"). Perhaps the extreme conditions of death row noted by
Hall actually cause disabling and incapacitating mental disorders that render condemned
inmates incompetent.
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in the hands of the client can, by limiting the scope of questioning, avoid
difficult issues that might necessitate an inquiry into the client's mental and
emotional state. This kind of lawyer needs only to verify that the client is
competent and is then free to do the client's bidding. But a lawyer who
disapproves of the client's request might be more inclined to probe for forms of
disability. Perhaps these forms of disability are not sufficient to render the
client incompetent, but under Model Rule 1.14, they may permit the lawyer to
usurp the goals of representation.
The problem with this is that death row lawyers looking for proof of
disability in their clients need only to open their eyes. 171 Every condemned
individual on death row is disabled in some way. It is axiomatic that at some
time, something went profoundly wrong with each person on death row;
otherwise, it would not have been possible for the individual to commit a
capital crime. 72 Healthy and well-adjusted individuals are not immediately
transformed into cold-blooded pitiless slayers who exhibit "the highest, the
utmost, callous disregard for human life" and thereby become eligible for the
death penalty.1 73  Healthy and well-adjusted individuals do not suddenly
commit murders that are "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."'174 Death
row, after all, is not populated by run of the mill murderers, or even by those
guilty of murder in the first degree, but is filled with the "worst of the worst." 17
Even those inmates who were not fundamentally damaged before their arrival
171. See THrETA H. WoLF, ALFRED BINET 347 n.3 (1973) (quoting Les Premiers Mots De La
These Idealiste, REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE 600 (1906) (Fr.)) (quoting psychologist Binet as saying,
"Tell me what you are looking for and I will tell you what you will find"). The lawyer who
wants to find disability in the capital client need only look. Even if it is not initially obvious,
inquiring into the client's past to gather mitigation evidence will almost certainly reveal some
form of "disability." The real question, then, is how deeply the lawyer is willing to dig to find
the disability that will warrant usurpation of the decisionmaking power.
172. See Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the
Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. Rv. 547, 561 (1995) ("There is increased recognition
that the roots of violent behavior extend beyond the personality or character structure of those
people who perform it, and connect historically to the brutalizing experiences they have
commonly shared as well as the immediately precipitating situations in which violence
transpires.").
173. See Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 468 (1993) (noting that the "utter disregard"
circumstance should be limited to the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer).
174. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255 (1976).
175. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) (holding that a capital statute's
aggravating factors must "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty"
in a way that reasonably justifies "the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant
compared to others found guilty of murder").
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on death row have in all likelihood been broken by their experiences on the
row.176 Perceiving disability is as simple as looking for it.
Thus, trying to apply the nebulous abstractions of the Model Rules to real
cases, involving real defendants who are making real statements about
volunteering for real executions, is exceptionally difficult to do in any
principled manner. To try is like attempting to climb a rope of sand.
B. Legal Realism: Applying Model Rules to Real Cases
Many death penalty attorneys do not believe that the Model Rules are
relevant in a capital context in the same way they are relevant to non-capital
representation. One attorney suggested:
There are two things that limit rigorous [application] of the Code of ethics
to the situation of people on death row. One is that there's almost no
parallel situation in the legal profession where you're representing a
population who, through a legal choice, can accomplish their own
death.... Secondly, the relationship between lawyers and death row
prisoners is also highly unusual in the legal context because it's almost
never compensated, at least by the client. It's such a discretionary universe
you don't see the same kind of application or even consideration of what
the lawyer's role is. I don't see the Code as having much bearing on this
stuff.177
Other attorneys have gone further, saying that the Model Rules are not only
irrelevant, but worthy of scorn and (where necessary) outright violation:
The Rules say that the decisions whether to pursue an appeal are for the
client to make .... but those rules are drafted with an eye to noncapital
appeals. I think the Rule is stupid in the context of a capital appeal and so I
ignore it, and I freely admit to you that I didn't give a shit if my client said
[he wanted to drop appeals]. I had no intention of letting that happen.'
78
Most attorneys are not this explicit in expressing their willingness to disregard
the prescriptions of the Model Rules and the wishes of the client, but there are
some attorneys who feel so strongly about their opposition to the death penalty
that no ethical code will temper their zeal. They are abolitionists, true
believers, and they will fight the death penalty tooth and claw until this
punishment is abandoned. 179
176. See infra Part V.C.2 (outlining death row syndrome).
177. Harrington, supra note 41, at 870-71 (quoting Attorney #13) (alterations in original).
178. Id. at 870 (quoting Attorney #12) (alterations in original).
179. Id. at 869 (quoting Attorney #11 as knowing other attorneys who would "lie, cheat,
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Such true believers exist, but it is probably more common for lawyers to
struggle against the silence of the Model Rules and to follow an amorphous and
intuitive ethical code in doing what is in the best interests of the client. One
attorney suggested:
I don't think the Rules are very clear at all and I think that's part of the
dilemma. It's not like there's some rule that [says] if your client wishes to
volunteer.., you must or must not support them. It's a lot more murky,
and the Rules essentially just say that you're supposed to work in the best
interest of your client. The question is, is volunteering in the best interest
of your client?
180
Unfortunately, the Model Rules are of little use in answering that question.
They are like Rorschach blots: capital attorneys see whatever they project into
them and then act accordingly. And because the Model Rules are largely silent,
lawyers are ultimately left to exercise their discretion in determining ethical
conduct, weighing up the values of autonomy against paternalism and using
their own idiosyncratic belief systems as decisionmaking heuristics.'81
V. Primum Non Nocere: Reasoning by Analogy
Thus far, this Article has argued that death row volunteering is a serious
and worsening problem,182 has indicated that legal challenges to the defendant's
competence are inadequate to prevent the depressed-but-sane client from
waiving his appeals, 183 and has indicated that the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct provide inadequate guidance for capital attorneys.184 A great deal has
and steal to avoid the execution of a client"); White, supra note 55, at 859 (describing defense
lawyers who are singularly focused on abolishing capital punishment).
180. Harrington, supra note 41, at 870 (quoting Attorney #7) (alterations in original).
181. Those predisposed to fighting against the death penalty, regardless of the personal
hardships that must be borne by the attorney and the client, might think about "the best interest
of the client" in terms of the Ranger credo: "I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the
hands of the enemy." The Ranger Creed, http://www.ranger.org/rangerCreed.html (last visited
Oct. 18, 2005). Those who are inclined to defer to the judgment of the client, however, might
think about the "the best interest of the client" by using the framework of another person who
volunteered for execution: Joan of Arc. "You promised me my life; but you lied. You think
that life is nothing but not being stone dead." GEORGE BERNARD SHAw, SAINT JOAN: MAJOR
BARBARA: ANDROCLES AND THE LION 150 (1952).
182. See supra Part II (noting the recent increase in both the number of death row inmates
and the percentage of those who volunteer).
183. See supra Part III (cataloging a list of defects that compromise the competency
hearing).
184. See supra Part IV (noting that while the Code provides useful ethical guidance, it is
silent on the subject of volunteering).
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been written about the problem of the volunteering client, but the volunteer
remains an ethical puzzle.
Yet meaningful guidance may be available. Although competence
hearings and the Model Rules may not resolve the problem for capital
attorneys, it might be possible to look outside the profession of law and to
ascertain how other professionals, confronted with analogous circumstances,
have established clear ethical guidelines. I argue that lawyers can glean
meaningful guidance from medical ethics by studying the conduct of physicians
confronted with end-of-life issues.
This Part of the Article proceeds in three steps. The first section reviews
the role of the physician in end-of-life decisionmaking, describing the legal and
ethical controversies surrounding euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. It
articulates the theoretical arguments for and against the practices, describes
what is empirically known about the attitudes and behaviors of the public,
physicians, and terminally-ill patients, and outlines the legal and ethical
constraints on physician acquiescence. The second section examines the
similarities and differences between capital lawyers with volunteering clients
and medical doctors with terminally-ill patients. It draws contrasts between
doctors and lawyers, between executions and illness, and it tries to ascertain
whether waiving appeals is more akin to withdrawal of treatment (which is
permitted under contemporary medical ethics) or physician-assisted suicide
(which is forbidden). The third and final section evaluates the extant literature
on the effects of long-term death row confinement. It reviews the case of
Soering v. United Kingdom, describes the phenomenon of "death row
syndrome," and asks whether an individual suffering from death row syndrome
is capable of knowingly and voluntarily waiving his capital appeals.
A. The Role of Medical Professionals in Terminating Life
Medical ethics enjoy a long and robust history. The Hippocratic Oath,
described by the American Medical Association (AMA) as "a living statement
of ideals to be cherished by the physician," 185 was codified in about 400 B .C.1
86
The heart of the Hippocratic Oath is, of course, the prohibition against harming
one's patient,187 often rendered in Latin as "Primum non nocere" ("First, do no
185. AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS x (1996-97).
186. See 38 HARvARD CLAssics: ScIENTFIc PAPERS 2 (Charles W. Eliot ed., 1910)
(describing the origins of the Hippocratic Oath).
187. The Oath includes the following pledge:
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harm").88 While the administration of the Oath has been criticized by some
critics,'8 9 most medical schools administer some form of the Oath.190 This, of
course, means that most practicing physicians are bound by the principle of
beneficence.
How, then, is the physician, as an ethically bound healer, supposed to
respond when a patient asks to die? On the one hand, the physician has
pledged under the Hippocratic Oath to work to the benefit of the patient, and
the overarching principle of beneficence might justify such an action. On the
other hand, the Oath is unequivocal in prohibiting the physician from doing
harm: "I will give no deadly medicine to any one if asked, nor suggest any such
counsel."'' How is the ethical physician expected to respond when a
terminally-ill patient, in intolerable pain, begs the doctor to end his life?192 The
I will follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability and judgment, I
consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and
mischievous. I will give no deadly medicine to any one if asked, nor suggest any
such counsel....
Id. at3.
188. The Hippocratic Oath, itself, does not contain these exact words. Many scholars
believe that Hippocrates did originate the phrase, in another of his writings, Epidemics, Bk. 1,
Sect. XI ("[M]ake a habit of two things-to help, or at least to do no harm."). But Hippocrates
wrote in his native Greek, and it is uncertain who is responsible for coining the Latin term.
Some attribute "Primum non nocere" to a translation of Hippocrates' Greek, while others credit
the Roman physician, Galen. "First, Do No Harm" Is Not in the Hippocratic Oath,
http://www.geocities.comleverwild7/noharm.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
189. See, e.g., Robert M. Veatch, White Coat Ceremonies: A Second Opinion, 28 J. MED.
EThics 5, 5-6 (2002) (criticizing medical schools for thrusting a single, monolithic oath upon a
diverse body of students, and doing so before they can decide if they agree with it or whether
they can live up to it).
190. See Robert D. Orr et al., Use of the Hippocratic Oath: A Review of Twentieth Century
Practice and a Content Analysis of Oaths Administered in Medical Schools in the U.S. and
Canada in 1993, 8 J. CLCAL Enmcs 377, 379-82 (1997) (reporting that ninety-eight percent
of the 150 medical schools that responded to the survey administered some form of the Oath,
that only one school used the classical version of the Hippocratic Oath, that one hundred percent
of the current Oaths pledged a commitment to patients, and that fourteen percent included a
prohibition against euthanasia).
191. Supra note 187.
192. The American Medical Association offers relevant guidance. The AMA believes that
"[t]he principle of patient autonomy requires that physicians must respect the decision to forgo
life-sustaining treatment of a patient who possesses decisionmaking capacity," and the AMA
believes that "[t]here is no ethical distinction between withdrawing and withholding life-
sustaining treatment," but the AMA states that "[p]hysicians must not perform euthanasia or
participate in assisted suicide. A more careful examination of the issue is necessary. Support,
comfort, respect for patient autonomy, good communication, and adequate pain control may
decrease dramatically the public demand for euthanasia and assisted suicide." See AM. MED.
ASS'N, PoLIcyF4nDER H-140.996, DECISIONS NEAR THE END OF LIFE, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2005). Although the AMA states that physicians
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principle of beneficence requires that the doctor alleviate the suffering, but the
principle of doing no harm prevents the doctor from ending life (even a life the
patient wishes to end). Could there ever be circumstances in which the
patient's life expectancy is so short and the patient's suffering is so great that
balancing the two principles would allow the doctor to engage in euthanasia
(ending the patient's suffering by intentionally ending the patient's life)?
193
Even if the physician should be absolutely barred from acting as the agent of
another's death, could there be circumstances in which the doctor could assist
the patient in terminating his or her own life (physician-assisted suicide)? 194
These difficult questions have fostered a vigorous debate among ethicists,
physicians, legislators, and the public.
Strong arguments have been marshaled on both sides of the debate. Those
who support euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide have identified at least
six important themes:
The right to die (autonomy): People should have the fundamental
right to make decisions about ending their own lives.
95
cannot perform euthanasia, they are permitted to provide palliative treatment to reduce pain and
suffering, even if this should have the consequence of hastening death.
193. Euthanasia has been alternatively defined as "the hastening of death of a patient to
prevent further sufferings" or as the "direct intentional killing of a person as part of the medical
care being offered." D.V.K. Chao et al., Euthanasia Revisited, 19 FAM. PRAC. 128, 128 (2002).
The American Medical Association defines euthanasia as "the administration of a lethal agent by
another person to a patient for the purpose of relieving the patient's intolerable and incurable
suffering." AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF ETHIcs E-2.21 (1996), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/8458.html (last visited Oct. 24,2005). The academic literature on
euthanasia has spawned at least two taxonomies. Euthanasia can be characterized as "voluntary"
(the patient has expressed a wish to die, and someone else implements that wish), "involuntary"
(the competent patient has not expressed a wish to die, but someone else terminates the patient's
life), and "non-voluntary" (the patient is incompetent, and someone else terminates the patient's
life). Chao et al., supra, at 128. Euthanasia also can be characterized as active (the patient's
life is ended with an affirmative act, such as the injection of a lethal drug) or passive (the
patient's life is ended through the omission of an act). Id. Some have argued that active
euthanasia is no worse than passive euthanasia, and drawing distinctions between the two
approaches is nothing more than an exaltation of form over substance. E.g., James Rachels,
Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 78, 180 (1975).
194. The American Medical Association states that "[p]hysician-assisted suicide occurs
when a physician facilitates a patient's death by providing the necessary means and/or
information to enable the patient to perform the life ending act." AM. MED. AW'N, CODE OF
ETHics E-2.21 1, supra note 193. Typically, the physician provides the patient with a lethal dose
of a drug, which the patient can then self-administer to end his or her life. Chao et al., supra
note 193, at 129.
195. E.g., RONALD DwoRKIN, LIFE's DOMINION 190-92, 222-29 (1993) (discussing how
autonomy is used in supporting the right to die); Chao et al., supra note 193, at 131 (listing five
reasons for allowing physician-assisted suicide); Joe Messerli, BalancedPolitics.org, Physician
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* Death with dignity: People should not be forced to remain
dependent upon others, to helplessly witness their own loss of
control, or to otherwise endure conditions that unacceptably
compromise human dignity.
196
* Relief of unbearable suffering (compassion): Medication cannot
adequately eliminate all physical and emotional suffering, and
people should not be forced to endure intolerable pain. 197
" Limited state interest: While the state may have an interest in
insuring the life of its citizens, such a state interest is dramatically
attenuated in the case of a terminally-ill patient.
198
* Relief of burdens on family members: A terminally-ill patient can
exact tremendous economic and emotional costs from family
members. Euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide can limit the
fiscal and emotional hardships visited upon the patient's
relatives. 199
* Ability to reallocate limited medical resources: If terminally-ill
patients are allowed to end their lives, doctors will be able to
spend their time with patients who have better prognoses.
Funding for medication or hospitalization can be shifted to those
Assisted Suicide (Pros & Cons, Arguments For and Against), http://www.balanced
politics.org/assistedsuicide.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2006) (describing the right to die as
something that should be a fundamental freedom).
196. E.g., DWORKIN, supra note 195, at 233-37 (discussing the right to dignity in death);
Chao et al., supra note 193, at 132 (listing the reasons to allow physician-assisted suicide);
Harvey Max Chochinov, Dignity and the Eye of the Beholder, 22 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1336,
1337 (2004) (investigating what it means to die with dignity); Margaret A. Drickamer et al.,
Practicalissues in Physician-Assisted Suicide, 126 ANNALS OFINTERNALMED. 146, 147 (1997)
(reporting survey results showing dignity as a factor in requesting physician-assisted suicide);
Messerli, supra note 195 (citing a patient's desire for dignity as a reason to allow the right to
die).
197. E.g., DWORKIN, supra note 195, at 16-18 (describing all living creatures' desires to
avoid pain); Chao et al., supra note 193, at 131 (listing limiting pain as a reason to allow
physician-assisted suicide); Drickamer et al., supra note 196, at 147 (reporting survey results
showing pain as a reason for requesting physician-assisted suicide); Messerli, supra note 195
(noting both patient and family pain as a basis for allowing physician-assisted suicide).
198. See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 820 (9th Cir. 1996)
(noting that, though the state does have an interest in preserving life, that interest is attenuated
when individuals cannot pursue happiness or liberty and no longer wish to live). But see
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (concluding that it is sufficient that the
state's prohibition on assisted suicide is rationally related to a legitimate state interest).
199. E.g., Chao et al., supra note 193, at 131 (listing reasons for allowing physician-
assisted suicide); Messerli, supra note 195 (noting reduced healthcare costs and family pain).
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who either could recover or who, while terminal, wish to remain
alive.
200
Similarly, those who oppose the practices of euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide have identified at least nine important themes:
* Sanctity of life: Life is inherently sacred, and nothing can justify
the deliberate taking of a human life.20 1
* Ability to alleviate suffering through less drastic means: The
"unbearable" suffering of a terminal illness can be made bearable
through palliative care and aggressive use of medication for pain
management.
20 2
" Risk of error. While doctors are particularly conscientious about
making terminal diagnoses, human error remains a problem. It is
possible to mix up patient files or to misdiagnose the patient as
terminal. A patient who is sick, but not actually terminal, may
elect to end his life in response to the label, "terminally ill.
'' 20 3
* Patients change their minds: Some terminally-ill patients who





* Patients' decisions may be affected by pressure from relatives:
Because of the medical costs associated with their treatment,
200. E.g., Chao et al., supra note 193, at 132 (listing reasons for allowing physician-
assisted suicide); Messerli, supra note 195 (noting that the funds spent keeping dying patients
alive could be spent on patients who could be saved).
201. E.g., DWORKIN, supra note 195, at 68-101, 194-96 (discussing the sanctity of life);
Chao et al., supra note 193, at 133 (listing the reasons for not allowing physician-assisted
suicide); Messerli, supra note 195 (citing the intrinsic value of human life as a basis for denying
physician-assisted suicide). But see Richard Hull, The Case for Physician-Assisted Suicide,
FREE INQUIRY, Spring 2003, at 35, 35 (noting that despite talk of sanctity of life, when a soldier
throws himself on a grenade, the knowing sacrifice of human life is lauded, not condemned).
202. E.g., AM. MED. Ass'N, supra note 192 (noting that adequate pain control may lessen
public demand for euthanasia); Chao et al., supra note 193, at 132 (stating that unbearable
suffering may be due to inadequate palliative care).
203. E.g., Messerli, supra note 195 (citing the possibility of mistake as a basis for denying
physician-assisted suicide).
204. E.g., Chao et al., supra note 193, at 132 (stating that many patients change their minds
after requesting euthanasia); P.J. van der Maas et al., Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions
Concerning the End of Life, 338 LANcET 669,673 (1991) (noting that, in one study, two-thirds
of those who requested euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide changed their minds). But see
Hull, supra note 201, at 35 (noting that the act of requesting physician-assisted suicide may
allow patients to draw attention to their suffering and to command the resources they need to
continue living).
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patients will feel pressured to end their lives as a means to limit
the financial burdens on their families. Even if family members
do not explicitly pressure the patient to end his life, a
conscientious patient may be sensitive to the crushing burden
incurred by health care costs.
205
" Slippery slope phenomenon: The practice of intentionally ending
human life will be widened from competent and terminally-ill
patients to other groups (e.g., the chronically ill, those in
persistent vegetative states, AIDS patients, or the elderly).
Applied more broadly, euthanasia may be used on an involuntary
basis, wielded as a weapon against the mentally retarded, the




* Abuse by policy-makers: Legislators might establish laws that
coerce patients to end their lives, or-in more extreme versions
such as the Nazi T4 program-that authorize involuntary
euthanasia for certain categories of undesirable persons.
20 7
" Prohibition of the Hippocratic Oath: Even if patients have a
theoretical right to die, there is no corresponding obligation for
physicians to assist patients in ending their lives. The Hippocratic
Oath unequivocally states that "I will give no deadly medicine to
any one if asked, nor suggest any such counsel." 208
205. E.g., Chao et al., supra note 193, at 133 (commenting that knowledge of the burden
would mean that any request would not be completely voluntary); Drickamer et al., supra note
196, at 147 (reporting survey results showing that ninety-three percent of physicians thought
that a patient might request physician-assisted suicide because they feared being a burden to
others); E.J. Emanuel, The History of Euthanasia Debates in the United States and Britain, 121
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 793,794 (1994) (describing how the issue of pressure on patients
has been a concern for many years).
206. E.g., DWORKIN, supra note 195, at 216-17 (mentioning the "slippery slope"
argument); Chao et al., supra note 193, at 132 (discussing concerns that euthanasia will expand
to other patients); D.J. Nyman et al., Euthanasia, 12 CRmrrcAL CARE C.Nic: ETHIcAL IssuEs 85,
90 (1996) (noting the "slippery slope" argument in Nazi Germany); Messerli, supra note 195
(citing the slippery slope as a reason to deny physician-assisted suicide). Recent articles report
that Dutch physicians are considering guidelines that would authorize the euthanizing of people
"with no free will," including children, the severely mentally retarded, and those in irreversible
comas. See, e.g., Dutch Ponder Mercy Killing Rules, CNN, Dec. 2, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/HEALTH/12/01/netherlands.mercykill/ (describing new guidelines
for euthanizing those without free will).
207. E.g., Chao et al., supra note 193, at 133 (citing Nazi Germany as the worst example of
politicians abusing euthanasia); E. Ernst, Killing in the Name of Healing: The Active Role of
the German Medical Profession During the Third Reich, 100 AM. J. MED. 579, 580 (1996)
(describing the Nazi euthanasia program).
208. E.g., Chao et al., supra note 193, at 133 (stating that a patient's right to die does not
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 147 (2006)
Public's loss of trust in physicians: If doctors are permitted to
save lives or end lives as they see fit, the public will lose
confidence in the doctor's principle of beneficence, and the
integrity of the medical profession will be compromised. 20 9
These theoretical arguments and counter-arguments have shaped
political debate in both the United States and abroad. While euthanasia
has been legalized in Belgium and the Netherlands, 210 it is illegal in all
United States jurisdictions and has been roundly condemned by the
211 2 12American Medical Association, the American Nurses' Association,
and the American Geriatrics Society.21 3 Similarly, while physician-
assisted suicide has been legalized in both Switzerland and the
Netherlands 214 and was briefly legalized in the Northern Territory of
Australia,2 5 the United States Supreme Court has concluded that there is no
mean a physician's right to kill); Messerli, supra note 195 (citing the Hippocratic Oath as a
reason to deny physician-assisted suicide); see also supra notes 187-90 and associated text
(describing the Hippocratic Oath's prohibitions against doing harm).
209. E.g., Chao et al., supra note 193, at 132-33 (finding that ambiguity in the doctor's
role may result in a loss of trust); Emanuel, supra note 205, at 800 (noting that increased
interest in euthanasia corresponds with attacks on physician authority). But see Hull, supra note
201, at 35 (noting that limiting euthanasia to physicians specializing in pain management and
subjecting decisions to ethics boards may adequately compensate for any increased public
suspicion).
210. See, e.g., Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-Assisted Suicide
(Oct. 2004), http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pas/2004_reports/102004.htm (describing
developments in a number of countries, including Belgium and the Netherlands). Technically,
euthanasia remains illegal in the Netherlands, but under a theory of "medical necessity" (i.e.,
there was a conflict of duties that justified the act), physicians are guaranteed immunity from
prosecution as long as they follow rules of careful practice. See Chao et al., supra note 193, at
129-30 (discussing the Dutch system).
211. AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OFETICS E-2.21, supra note 193 (noting that "[e]uthanasia is
fundamentally incompatible with the physician's role as healer, would be difficult or impossible
to control, and would pose serious societal risks"); AM. MED. ASS'N, POLICY STATEMENT H-
140.966(4), supra note 192 (stating unequivocally that "[p]hysicians must not perform
euthanasia").
212. AM. NuRSEs' Ass'N, POSITION STATEMENT ON ASSISTED SUICIDE (1994), available at
http://nursingworld.org/readroomlpositionlethics/prtetsuic.htm.
213. Am. Geriatric Soc'y Ethics Comm., Physician-Assisted Suicide and VoluntaryActive
Euthanasia, 43 J. AM. GERIATRIC Soc'Y 579, 579 (1995).
214. See, e.g., Vollmar, supra note 210 (describing international developments in a number
of countries, including Switzerland and the Netherlands).
215. See Chao et al., supra note 193, at 129 (describing passage and repeal of Act); S.
Cordner & K. Ettershank, Australian Senate Overturns World's First Euthanasia Law, 349
LANCEr 932, 932 (1997) (reporting repeal of Rights of the Terminally Ill Act); S. Cordner,
Australia's Northern Territory Euthanasia Law Passed, 347 LANCEr 609,609 (1996) (reporting
passage of Rights of the Terminally Ill Act).
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constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide. 216 Rather, it is a matter for
each state to decide. Today, the practice remains illegal in all but one United
States jurisdiction: Oregon.
In November 1994, Oregon voters passed the Oregon Death with Dignity
Act,217 a voter initiative, by a narrow margin of fifty-one to forty-nine
percent.218 The implementation of the Act was delayed by an injunction, but
after the Ninth Circuit lifted the injunction,219 physician-assisted suicide
became a legal option for terminally-ill patients in Oregon beginning in October
1997. In November 1997, Oregon House Bill 2954 (repealing the Death with
Dignity Act) was placed on the general election ballot, but Oregon voters chose
to retain the Act by a margin of sixty to forty percent.220
The Act permits physicians to honor patients' requests for a lethal dose of
drugs, provided that the patient has less than six months to live, that two
doctors confirm the diagnosis, and that they determine the patient is competent
to make the request.22 1 The Act authorizes physician-assisted suicide but
explicitly prohibits euthanasia.222 Research indicates that during the first year
of the Act's implementation, twenty-three individuals received prescriptions for
lethal medication and that fifteen of these twenty-three died after taking their
medication.223 Other studies of the Oregon experience suggest that a modest
number of terminally-ill Oregonians pursue and employ physician-assisted
suicide:224 Only 171 people have ended their lives via physician-assisted
216. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,723-24 (1997) (finding that the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause does not include the right to suicide); Vacco v. Quill, 521
U.S. 793, 804-06 (1997) (drawing a line between assisting suicide and withdrawal of unwanted
lifesaving medical treatment).
217. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2003).
218. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERvs., SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON OREGON'S DEATH WITH
DIGNITY AcT (2005), available at http://www.egov.orgegon.gov/DHS/phlpas/docs/year7.pdf
(reporting Nov. 1994 voter results).
219. David G. Savage, Justices to Hear Case on Oregon's Suicide Law, L.A. TIMEs, Feb.
23, 2005, at 1.
220. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERvs., supra note 218 (reporting Nov. 1997 voter results).
221. OR. REv. STAT. § 127.815 (2003).
222. OR. REv. STAT. § 127.880 (2003) ("Nothing in ORS 127.800 to 127.897 shall be
construed to authorize a physician or any other person to end a patient's life by lethal injection,
mercy killing or active euthanasia.").
223. Arthur E. Chin et al., Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon-the First
Year's Experience, 340 NEw ENG. J. MED. 577, 578 (1999).
224. See Linda Ganzini et al., Physicians' Experiences with the Oregon Death with Dignity
Act, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 557, 558-61 (2000) (reporting that five percent of survey
respondents reported requests for lethal medication, that eighteen percent received prescriptions,
and that ten percent died from taking the prescribed medication).
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suicide since the Act took effect.225 Supporters of the Act believe the law is
functioning as it was designed.226
Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, however, continues to attract legal
challenges. On November 6, 200 1, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a
directive entitled "Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide,,
227
claiming that assisted suicide is not a legitimate medical purpose, and that
federal law regulating controlled substances supersedes state laws permitting
physician-assisted suicide.228 The next day, the Oregon Attorney General filed
suit in district court, seeking an injunction against the federal government to bar
it from interfering with the Death with Dignity Act. On November 8, District
Judge Robert E. Jones issued a temporary restraining order, "enjoining the
defendants from enforcing, applying, or otherwise giving any legal effect to the
attorney general's directive,, 2 29 reasoning that Ashcroft's directive would do
"irreparable harm" to those citizens of Oregon who were relying on the Death
with Dignity Act.230 In April 2002, Judge Jones issued a permanent injunction
against the Ashcroft directive, reasoning that Congress never intended, through
the Controlled Substances Act or through any other federal law, to confer
blanket authority to the Attorney General to define what constitutes the
legitimate practice of medicine.231 Rather, Jones concluded, the control and
232regulation of medicine remains fundamentally an area of state prerogative.
Ashcroft appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, but the decision was
upheld.233
225. Savage, supra note 219.
226. See Lois Snyder & Arthur L. Kaplan, Assisted Suicide: Finding Common Ground,
132 ANNALS INTERNAL MEDIcINE 468,468-69 (2000) ("Proponents will say the law is working,
that the floodgates have not, in fact, been opened and that no abuses have occurred."). But see
Man Survives Doctor-Assisted Suicide Attempt, MSNBC, Mar. 4, 2005,
http://msnbc.comlid/7090928 (reporting that an Oregon patient awoke after ingesting a "lethal"
dose of barbiturates).
227. 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607 (Nov. 9, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1306).
228. Id.
229. See Amber Orr & Linda MacDonald Glenn, Oregon v. Ashcroft: Physician Assisted
Suicide with Federally Controlled Substances, VIRTUAL MENTOR, Jan. 2003, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/9462.html.
230. Id.
231. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1089 (D. Or. 2002).
232. Id. at 1092 ("The determination of what constitutes a legitimate medical practice or
purpose traditionally has been left to the individual states. State statutes, state medical boards,
and state regulations control the practice of medicine.").
233. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004).
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More recently, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
case. 234 On January 17, 2006, the Court ruled, in a six-to-three decision, that
the Controlled Substances Act does not allow the United States Attorney
General to prohibit doctors from prescribing drugs for use in physician-assisted
suicide under the law permitting the procedure.235
Oregon passed the Death with Dignity Act more than ten years ago and
has successfully defended it against both legislation and litigation, but
curiously, all comparable state initiatives have failed. Voters in Washington,
California, and Maine have considered-and rejected-legalizing physician-
assisted suicide. 236  Michigan voters rejected a physician-assisted suicide
measure as well.237 Indeed, responding to the notorious assisted suicides of
Jack Kevorkian, the iconic champion of American euthanasia,238 the Michigan
legislature amended its state laws to criminalize the acts of anyone who assisted
in suicide. 239 In 1999, Dr. Kevorkian was sentenced to ten to twenty-five years
in prison for second-degree murder.24
Today, Oregon remains a curious anomaly, standing alone among
American states. "Forty-six states stand opposed to Oregon, formally
criminalizing [physician-assisted suicide]. Forty of them (most recently Ohio in
November 2002) have passed statutes that prohibit the practice, and six prohibit
234. Gonzales v. Oregon, 543 U.S. 1145 (2005).
235. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 925 (2006).
236. Faith Lagay, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Law and Professional Ethics, VIRTuAL
MENTOR, Jan. 2003, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/9422.html.
237. Id.
238. Jack Lessenberry, Death Becomes Him, VANITY FAIR, July 1994, at 108, available at
http://www.kevork.org/vanityfa.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2005) (noting that Dr. Jack
Kevorkian's "fame is nationwide: 94 percent of Americans know who he is; only the president
and First Lady have higher name recognition").
239. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.329(a) (West 2004) (effective Sept. 1, 1998). The
law criminalized the actions of any person who:
(a) Provides the means by which the individual attempts to kill himself or herself or
kills himself or herself
(b) Participates in an act by which the individual attempts to kill himself or herself
or kills himself or herself
(c) Helps the individual plan to attempt to kill himself or herself.
Id.
240. Bryan Robinson et al., Kevorkian Sentenced to 10 to 25 Yearsfor Murder, CouRT TV,
Apr. 13, 1999, http://www.courttv.com/trials/kevorkian/041399_pm-ctv.html (reporting that
Kevorkian was sentenced to ten to twenty-five years for the second-degree murder of Thomas
Youk).
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it by common law. Three states-North Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming-have
neither criminalized nor legalized physician-assisted suicide.
241
This is peculiar, given the widespread public support for physician-
assisted suicide. Public opinion polls indicate that most Americans favor
242legalization. Even physicians, as a class, are not unanimous in their
condemnation of the practice. Although the AMA has taken a firm position
against physician-assisted suicide,243 and although their position carries
significant weight,244 research indicates that many physicians condone or
affirmatively support the practice.245 One study reported that only about one-
third of Oregon physicians had moral, ethical, or religious objections to
assisting in suicides. 246 Another study reported that, in Oregon, about one in
six requests for physician-assisted suicide were granted, and that about one in
ten of these requests resulted in suicide. 47
A nationwide study of physicians indicated that nearly one in five doctors
(18.3%) had received a request for life-ending medication and that 11.1% had
received a request for a lethal injection; 11% of the physicians said they would
prescribe lethal medication under current legal constraints (36% if it was legal),
241. Lagay, supra note 236.
242. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 118, at tbl.2.94, available at http://www.albany.
edu/sourcebook/pdf/t296.pdf (noting that, between 1996 and 2004, public support for legalizing
physician-assisted suicide ranged between a low of fifty-two percent and a high of sixty-eight
percent).
243. See AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF ETHics E-2.21 1, supra note 193 (noting that
"physician-assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the physician's role as healer,
would be difficult or impossible to control, and would pose serious societal risks"). This
language is identical to that used in the AMA's prohibition against euthanasia. See supra note
211 (emphasizing the contrast between the physician's role as healer and euthanasia).
244. See Kenneth Baum, "To Comfort Always": Physician Participation in Executions, 5
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 47, 56 n.32 (2001) ("The fact that the AMA has weighed in
against physician participation is of great importance, due to its recognized role, both inside and
outside the profession, as the voice of organized medicine.... Even the judicial system looks to
the AMA for guidance on issues of medical ethics."); David Orentlicher, The Influence of a
Professional Organization on Physician Behavior, 57 ALB. L. REV. 583, 591 (1994)
(concluding that "professional regulation can have a substantial impact on physician behavior").
245. See Simon M. Whitney et al., Views of United States Physicians and Members of the
American Medical Association House of Delegates on Physician-Assisted Suicide, 16 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 290, 293 (2001) (reporting that while only 23.5% of AMA delegates believe
there should be a law legalizing physician-assisted suicide, 44.5% of surveyed rank-and-file
physicians favor such a law); Physicians: Leave Assisted Suicide to Doctors, Patients,
AMEDNEWS.COM, June 4,2001, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2001/06/04/prsaO6O4.htr.
246. Melinda A. Lee et al., Legalizing Assisted Suicide-Views of Physicians in Oregon,
334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 310, 311 (1996).
247. See Ganzini, supra note 224, at 563 (studying the effect of the Death With Dignity
Act).
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and 7% said they would provide a lethal injection (24% if it was legal); 3.3%
reported that they had written at least one lethal prescription, and 4.7% reported
administering at least one lethal injection.248 Overall, 6.4% of the doctors
"reported having acceded to at least one request for assistance with suicide or a
lethal injection." 249 This study indicated that pain control was the main reason
that doctors acquiesced to patients' requests for life-ending treatment;
250
interestingly, though, the doctors perceived that most patients were motivated
to end their lives not because of pain, but because of psychological distress
l.25
A growing body of literature indicates that terminally-ill patients do not
end their lives because of physical pain, but because of psychological
conditions.252 The physicians surveyed in the nationwide study believed that
patients asked for assistance because of the following reasons: discomfort other
than pain, loss of dignity, fear of uncontrollable symptoms, actual pain, loss of
meaning in their lives, being a burden, and dependency.2 3 Similarly, other
researchers have found that decisions to seek physician-assisted suicide were
associated with concerns about loss of autonomy and control, not fear of
pain.254
Two psychological states appear to be particularly linked to requests for
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide: depression and hopelessness. 255 The
248. See Diane E. Meier et al., A National Survey of Physician-Assisted Suicide and
Euthanasia in the United States, 338 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1193, 1195, 1199 (1998) (reporting
data from national physician survey).
249. Id. at 1195.
250. See id. at 1195-96 (reporting data from national physician survey).
251. See id. at 1195 (reporting data from national physician survey).
252. See Harvey Max Chochinov et al., Depression, Hopelessness, and Suicidal Ideation in
the Terminally Ill, 39 PSYCHOSOMATIcs 366, 368-69 (1998) (identifying a range of putative risk
factors for suicide and stating that depression is the dimension of psychopathology with the
most empirical support); Ezekiel J. Emmanuel et al., Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted
Suicide: Attitudes and Experience of Oncology Patients, Oncologists, and the Public, 347
LANcEr 1805, 1809 (1996) (reporting that depression, not pain, was related to the hoarding of
drugs for possible future suicide attempts); Keith G. Wilson et al., Attitudes of Terminally Ill
Patients Toward Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 160 ARCHIVES OFINTERNALMED.
2454, 2454 (2000) (concluding that "psychological considerations may be at least as salient as
physical symptoms").
253. See Meier et al., supra note 248, at 1195 (listing the cited reasons in descending order
of reporting).
254. See Chin et al., supra note 223, at 582 (studying Oregon's legalization of physician-
assisted suicide); see also Meier et al., supra note 248, at 1195 (listing "discomfort other than
pain," "loss of dignity," and "fear of uncontrollable symptoms" as more prominent in
physicians' perception of their patients' end-of-life decisionmaking than actual pain).
255. See William Breitbart et al., Depression, Hopelessness, and Desire for Hastened
Death in Terminally Ill Cancer Patients, 284 JAMA 2907, 2910 (2000) (identifying both
depression and hopelessness as correlative factors); Harvey Max Chochinov et al., Prevalence of
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256two conditions sometimes overlap, but research indicates that both factors
contribute independently toward the desire for a hastened death.257
Clinical depression,258 relatively common among terminal patients
considering physician-assisted suicide,259 may increase the likelihood of suicide
"by diminishing the ability to appreciate life's benefits and magnifying life's
burdens. ,260 One study found that "all of the patients who had either desired
premature death or contemplated suicide were judged to be suffering from
clinical depressive illness; that is, none of those patients who did not have
clinical depression had thoughts of suicide or wished that death would come
early."261 Another study found that depressed patients were four times more
262
likely to have a high desire for hastened death than non-depressed patients.
But among terminally-ill patients, depressive symptoms are not necessarily
evidence of psychopathology. Indeed, Margaret Drickamer and her colleagues
have suggested that "[wihen mild, such depressive psychological symptoms as
dysphoria, hopelessness, diminished self-esteem, and difficulty experiencing
Depression in the Terminally Ill: Effects of Diagnostic Criteria and Symptom Threshold
Judgements, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 537, 539 (1994) (studying the prevalence of depression
and the difficulty of accurate diagnosis).
256. See Chochinov, supra note 196, at 1337 ("Several studies have reported that
hopelessness is an ardent predictor of suicidal ideation, even among the terminally ill, and that
hopelessness is usually most pronounced in patients meeting criteria for major depression.").
But see Breitbart et al., supra note 255, at 2911 (noting only a modest correlation (r = 0.29)
between depression and hopelessness).
257. See Breitbart et al., supra note 255, at 2910 (concluding that "depression and
hopelessness provide independent contributions to desire for hastened death"); Chochinov et al.,
supra note 252, at 366 (reporting a "relatively consistent association between hopelessness and
suicide that cannot be explained by depression alone").
258. See supra note 127 & tbl.2 (identifying diagnostic criteria for major depression).
259. See Drickamer et al., supra note 196, at 147 (describing the mental state of patients);
Emmanuel et al., supra note 252 (describing "patients who had seriously considered and
prepared for... physician-assisted suicide... [as] significantly more likely to be depressed");
see also Breitbart et al., supra note 255, at 2910 (reporting "substantial rates" (17%) of clinical
depression among his sample).
260. Drickamer et al., supra note 196; see also Mark D. Sullivan & Stuart J. Younger,
Depression, Competence, and the Right to Refuse Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 151 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 971, 976 (1994) (studying the complex interaction between depression-related
suicidal ideation and a competent patient's right to refuse medical care).
261. James H. Brown et al., Is It Normalfor Terminally Ill Patients to Desire Death?, 143
AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 208, 210 (1986) (suggesting that terminally-ill patients not suffering from
depression were no more likely to desire premature death than the general population).
262. See Breitbart et al., supra note 255, at 2910 (emphasizing the effect of depression on
patients' desires for death).
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pleasure may be realistic responses to a terminal prognosis and the limitations
associated with terminal illness. ,
263
Hopelessness appears to play an even greater role in patient suicide than
depression. 264 Hopelessness, "characterized as a pessimistic cognitive style
rather than an assessment of... poor prognosis," 265 can become the lens
through which patients view all issues of death and dying. Hopelessness may
be closely linked to feelings of helplessness, which has been advanced as a
causal theory for human depression. 266 A sense of powerlessness, of futility,
and of vainness may lead to both (1) feelings of despair and depression, and
(2) a need to do something-anything--decisive, such as terminating one's life.
Thus, for individuals consumed with hopelessness, physician-assisted suicide
can loom as a particularly compelling alternative.267
When depression and hopelessness are simultaneously present, the
likelihood of suicide becomes even greater. William Breitbart and his
colleagues wrote:
Among [terminal] patients who were neither depressed nor hopeless, none
had high desire for hastened death, whereas approximately one fourth of the
patients with either one of these factors had high desire for hastened death,
and nearly two thirds of patients with both depression and hopelessness had
high desire for hastened death.268
For those who suffer from both depression and hopelessness, perseverance
becomes the exception, and suicidal ideation becomes the rule. The promise of
assisted suicide becomes a comfort. But how should the medical profession
respond to the plight of terminally-ill patients who are motivated not by the
need to escape intolerable physical pain, but by the desire to retain a vestige of
263. Drickamer et al., supra note 196, at 148. In the same way, what diagnostically
appears to be clinical depression may be nothing more than an adaptive response to the
conditions of death row. See supra note 150 (noting that it can be extraordinarily difficult to
diagnose depression on death row because responses that are appropriate to life on death row
register as depressive symptoms on psychological instruments).
264. See Breitbart et al., supra note 255, at 2909 (reporting a stronger relationship between
hopelessness and desire for death than between depression and desire for death); Chochinov et
al., supra note 252, at 369 (stating that studies show "hopelessness is associated with suicidal
ideation more strongly than is depression").
265. Breitbart et al., supra note 255, at 2910; see also Chochinov et al., supra note 252, at
367 (examining the relation between depression and hopelessness).
266. See Seligman, supra note 122, at 411 (studying the "behavioral and psychological
impact of uncontrollable traumatic events").
267. See Chochinov et al., supra note 252, at 369 (concluding that hopelessness is a better
indicator of suicidal ideation than depression).
268. Breitbart et al., supra note 255, at 2910.
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dignity?269 How should the medical profession respond to incurable patients
who make their decisions because of subjective states of depression and
hopelessness? 270  Should it honor their wishes or, with regret, refuse their
requests? Though individual physicians may be sympathetic 27 and though the
practice may be legally permissible in Oregon, the AMA has stated that
physician-assisted suicide is inconsistent with the role of the physician and
therefore has forbidden it as unethical.272
Can the AMA's bright-line rule provide meaningful guidance to the death
row lawyer confronted with a volunteering client?273 Can the same principle of
beneficence be superimposed on the framework of the capital attorney? Given
the elevated rates of depression on death row274 and the hopelessness borne of
275dehumanizing conditions of incarceration,  the rate of desire for hastened
death among condemned men must be very high. Having a bright-line legal
rule prohibiting the attorney's involvement might be useful, but such a rule
would be appropriate only if the situation of the attorney with a volunteering
death row client is sufficiently analogous to that of the physician with a
terminally-ill patient who requests physician-assisted suicide.
Accordingly, the next section compares the role of the doctor and lawyer
and contrasts death by terminal illness to death by execution. It asks whether
the lawyer's role in a case of capital volunteering more resembles physician-
assisted suicide, which is forbidden, or the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment, which is legal in all United States jurisdictions, and is viewed as non-
27627controversial, even by medical associations such as the AMA.27 7 If the analogies
269. See supra note 252 and accompanying text (suggesting that psychological factors play
a greater role than pain in decisions to pursue physician-assisted suicide).
270. See supra notes 255-65 and accompanying text (describing roles of depression and
hopelessness in making end-of-life decisions).
271. See supra notes 246, 248 and accompanying text (describing moderate physician
support for physician-assisted suicide).
272. See supra notes 192,211, 243 (forbidding involvement of physicians in euthanasia or
physician-assisted suicide).
273. Presumably, the same analysis might apply to lawyers who represent terminally-ill
patients, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.
274. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (describing elevated rates of clinical
depression in prison).
275. See infra notes 333-71 and accompanying text (describing the dehumanizing
conditions of confinement on death row).
276. See Allen C. Snyder, Competency to Refuse Lifesaving Treatment: Valuing the
NonlogicalAspects of a Person's Decisions, 10 IssuEs LAW & MED. 299,300 (noting that since
1986, "courts have accepted the principle that a patient retains the right to refuse treatment, even
when halting that treatment would result in the patient's death").
277. AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF ETHics E-2.20 (1996). The Code states:
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are sound, and if death row representation is more akin to physician-assisted suicide
than to withdrawal of treatment, the AMA's unequivocal position on physician-
assisted suicide may shed important light on the ambiguous demands of
contemporary legal ethics.
B. Adequacy of the Analogy
There are obvious similarities between the lawyer with a death row client who
wants to volunteer for execution and the doctor with a terminally-ill patient who
wants to volunteer for physician-assisted suicide. Several others have touched upon
the theme,278 and at least one scholar has published a sustained comparison of the
twO.
27 9 There are, however, essential differences between the two. The application
of medical ethics to the conundrum of the death volunteer is only warranted if the
situations are sufficiently analogous: if lawyers sufficiently resemble doctors, and if
pending executions sufficiently resemble terminal illness.
1. Equating Doctors and Lawyers
In her comparison of physician-assisted suicide and capital volunteering, Julie
Levinsohn Milner notes that several themes figure prominently in both cases-
competency, potential for abuse, irreversibility of death, and the preservation of
280life-and concludes that the situations should be treated similarly. She goes
on to argue that "[n]ot only are the legal issues and state interests comparable
and analogous between these two topics, so too are the issues facing the
The social commitment of the physician is to sustain life and relieve suffering.
Where the performance of one duty conflicts with the other, the preferences of the
patient should prevail. The principle of patient autonomy requires that physicians
respect the decision to forego life-sustaining treatment of a patient who possesses
decisionmaking capacity.
Id.
278. See, e.g., Lenhard ex rel. Bishop v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 815 (1979) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (insisting that a condemned prisoner's waiver of appeals "amounts to nothing less
than state-administered suicide"); Mello, supra note 42, at 49 (noting that death row prisoners,
uniquely, can receive state-assisted suicide).
279. See Julie Levinsohn Milner, Note, Dignity or Death Row: Are Death Row Rights to
Die Diminished? A Comparison of the Right to Die for the Terminally Ill and the Terminally
Sentenced, 24 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 279 passim (1998) (comparing
physician-assisted suicide by terminally ill patients with death row inmates who volunteer for
execution).
280. See id. at 291 (comparing physician-assisted suicide by terminally ill patients with
death row inmates who volunteer for execution).
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lawyers and doctors involved. Both a doctor and a defense lawyer cope with
similar personal and professional conflicts. ''28' Milner focuses her comparison
on three tensions: (1) the tension between what the client-patient wants and
what is permitted by standard professional practice,282 (2) the tension between
what the client-patient wants and what can be risked under the threat of
malpractice claims, 283 and (3) the tension between what the client-patient wants
and the personal beliefs of the doctor-lawyer. 284 These similarities are both
relevant and meaningful, but the physician and the attorney are also similar in
several other (less abstract) ways.
Physicians and attorneys both possess advanced academic degrees. The
AMA describes the educational process of becoming a doctor as "lengthy."
285
A physician begins with four years at a college or university to earn a B.A. or
B.S. degree, studies for four more years at an accredited medical school to earn
a M.D. degree, takes up a residency for three to seven more years, and then, if
interested in a specialized area of practice, studies for an additional one to three
286years. It takes anywhere from eleven to nearly twenty years of higher
education to become a doctor. While the educational process of becoming a
lawyer is not as arduous, it still involves four years of college for a B.A. or B.S.
degree and three years in an accredited law school to earn a J.D. degree.287 It
typically takes seven years of higher education to become a lawyer.
Moreover, both doctors and lawyers must become licensed by the state in
which they wish to practice before they can put their educations to work.
Doctors must obtain a license to practice medicine, and lawyers must be
admitted to the bar. Even after becoming licensed, doctors and lawyers may be
required to earn continuing education credits to maintain their knowledge and
skills.288 But once they have been appropriately licensed, doctors and lawyers
281. Id. at 302.
282. See id. at 302-08 (exploring the similarities between doctors and lawyers).
283. See id. at 308-09 (discussing the possibility of malpractice claims from the
perspectives of both doctors and lawyers).
284. See id. at 310-12 (noting the difficulties inherent in the situation when a client-patient
wishes to die).
285. AM. MED. ASS'N, How Do You BECOME A PHYsICLN?, http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama/pub/category/14365.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2005) ("The education of physicians in the
United States is lengthy and involves undergraduate education, medical school and graduate
medical education.").
286. Id.
287. LAWFORKIDS.ORG, How LONG DoEs rr TAKE AND WHAT DO You HAVE To Do TO
BECOME A LAwYER?, http://www.lawforkids.org/speakup/view-question.cfm?id=422 (last
visited Mar. 8, 2005).




enjoy near-unique professional status. Both medicine and law are potentially
lucrative careers. In 2002, family practitioners in America averaged an annual
salary of $150,267 and anesthesiologists averaged $306,964;289 lawyers in
America averaged $90,290.290 And as members of the "professions -291 _
careers which require extensive training and specialized study--doctors and
lawyers belong to the most prestigious careers in existence. The Nam-Powers-
Boyd Occupational Status Scale ranks the status of occupations between one
and one hundred.292 Dishwashers, cafeteria attendants, and counter attendants
have a status score of one.293 Physicians and surgeons, on the other hand, have
a status score of one hundred .294 And despite all the mean-spirited lawyer jokes
in the world, lawyers have a status score of ninety-nine: nearly as high as
physicians.
295
Perhaps doctors and lawyers enjoy this kind of status because they
obfuscate their work with a cant of appropriated Latin296 or because they have
specialized knowledge and skills. Doctors can give an injection, set a broken
bone, or prescribe narcotic medication; lawyers can draft a contract, prepare a
will, or subpoena documents. Perhaps they enjoy this kind of status because
289. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS,
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos074.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2005) (reporting educational
requirements, working conditions, job outlook, and income of physicians and surgeons).
290. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LAWYERS, http:/lwww.bls.gov/oco/ocosO53.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2005) (reporting educational requirements, working conditions, job outlook,
and income of lawyers).
291. See Michael Davis, Professions and War, 16 PERSPS. ON PROFS. 1, 1 (1997) (tracing
the etymological history of the word "professions").
292. Charles B. Nam & Monica Boyd, Occupational Status in 2000: Over a Century of
Census-Based Measurement, 23 POPULATION RES. & POL'Y REv. 327, 331 (2004) (reviewing
occupational status). A table identifying the Nam-Powers-Boyd occupational status scores is
available at http://www.fsu.edu/-popctr/papers/floridastate/04-149.pdf (last visited Nov. 7,
2005).
293. See id.
294. See id. The only other occupation to enjoy a status score of 100 is that of a dentist.
Id.
295. Id. Lawyers actually have a higher score than "judges, magistrates, and other judicial
workers" (ninety-eight) and, with a score of ninety-nine, rival occupations such as "astronomers
and physicists," "optometrists," and "podiatrists." Except for these three careers, no other listed
occupation matches the status associated with lawyers. Id.
296. See Russ VERSTEEG, ESSENTIAL LATIN FOR LAWYERS (1990) (explaining Latin terms
commonly used in law); Elena Mare~kovA et al., Latin as the Language of Medical
Terminology: Some Remarks on Its Role and Prospects, 132 Swiss MED. WKLY. 581, 581
(2002), available at http://www.smw.ch/pdf2OOx/2002/41/smw-10027.pdf (last visited Mar. 8,
2005) (noting that Latin phrases are commonly used in anatomical, clinical, pharmaceutical, and
other medical contexts).
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they are so educated and because, at least in the minds of some members of the
public, education translates into wisdom.
Perhaps it is something else. Maybe doctors and lawyers enjoy the status
they do because the public understands, or intuits, that they are bound by
principles of professional ethics, the hallmarks of which are beneficence,297
responsibility to the client, 298 and a duty of confidentiality. 299 The need for
clients and patients to confide openly and candidly with their counsel and their
healers is so essential to the practices of medicine and law that some of these
individuals, like a spouse or a member of the clergy, enjoy a legal privilege
against testifying.3°
297. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (1999) (noting that the lawyer
"should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the client's behalf"); id. R. 1.2(a) (noting the lawyer's duty to serve the interests
of the client); supra note 187 (noting the physician's oath to do all that is advantageous and to
refrain from anything that is harmful). In some ways, the beneficence of the doctor and the
lawyer appear to be distinguishable. The doctor's beneficence is defined by an objective
good-avoiding harm to the patient-while the lawyer's beneficence is defined by a subjective
good-serving the lawful interests of the client, whatever these might be. But the distinction
between medical and legal beneficence is not as clear-cut as it appears. The doctor's polestar of
harm is actually somewhat subjective. Cosmetic surgeons regularly subject their patients to all
of the risks associated with surgery (e.g., general anesthesia, drug reactions, infection, and pain)
even though there may be no physical benefit associated with the procedure. Yet this is ethical
because the psychological benefits of the surgery outweigh the medical risks. Similarly, the
lawyer's polestar of "the client's interests" is actually somewhat objective. Even though a
condemned client might want to waive his rights of appeal, he cannot do so. His conviction
must be appealed, even if he instructs his lawyer not to appeal. See supra note 45 (noting that
forty-nine states do not allow defendants to waive their sentence reviews). And while lawyers
must generally abide by their clients' decisions concerning the goals of representation, they are
prohibited from violating the law or their professional obligations. See MODEL RULES OFPROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (1999), R. 1.2 cmt. 1 (noting that the lawyer must act "within the limits
imposed by the law and.., professional obligations").
298. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (1999) (describing the lawyer's
obligations regarding the scope of representation); supra note 187 (stating the physician's oath
to act on behalf of the patient).
299. See MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (1999) (noting that the "lawyer shall
not reveal information of a client"); AMA, PATIENT CONFIDENTIALITY, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/4610.html (last visited Mar. 8,2005) ("Physicians have always had a
duty to keep their patients' confidences. In essence, the physician's duty to maintain
confidentiality means that a physician may not disclose any medical information revealed by a
patient or discovered by a physician in connection with the treatment of a patient.").
300. See Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance-Testimonial Privileges
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 772 (2002) (tracing the common law
development of legal privilege and describing the efforts to codify it); id. at 780 (describing
evolution of the attorney-client privilege); id. at 781 (noting that though there is no general
privilege for physicians, certain types of medical information are protected); id. at 780-81
(recognizing the spousal testimony privilege and the clergy-communicant privilege).
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Physicians and attorneys have fundamentally different skill sets. While
physicians are trained as scientists and interact with their patients as organisms,
lawyers are trained as advocates (achieving their objectives with the power of
rhetoric and logic) and interact with their clients as egos, as wills. Yet
physicians and attorneys are not so very different. Both doctors and lawyers
use their specialized knowledge to solve other people's problems. Both doctors
and lawyers apply their specialized skills in situations involving real human
beings, and both are regularly called upon to navigate complicated ethical
circumstances. The circumstances surrounding the capital volunteer are
different from those surrounding the terminal patient seeking physician-assisted
suicide, but the obligations of the doctor and the lawyer are equivalent. Both
must offer the best counsel they can, and both must seek to advance the
interests of the patient-client under the principles of beneficence, responsibility,
and confidentiality. Thus, for purposes of the analysis, physicians (as healers)
and attorneys (as champions) are analytically analogous.
2. Equating Illness and Execution
In her comparison of terminal patients and death row volunteers, Julie
Levinsohn Milner identifies several ways in which terminal illnesses and
executions are different.3°' She acknowledges that the death of a terminal
patient is a private matter while the death of a condemned inmate is generally
considered to be a public matter,302 she recognizes that the distinction between
active and passive approaches to ending life complicate the analysis, 30 3 and she
addresses the essential difference between someone whose life is ending
because of disease and someone whose life is ending because of state-imposed
punishment.3°  In Milner's view, however, these distinctions are not
dispositive. 30 5 Terminal illness and pending execution are to be treated as
analogues.
There are other sound reasons to equate the two. For both the terminal
patient exploring physician-assisted suicide and the condemned inmate
301. Milner, supra note 279, at 322 ("There are, of course, differences between the
terminally ill patient and death row inmate and their respective situations.").
302. Id. at 322-24 (distinguishing between public and private matters).
303. Id. at 324-27 (distinguishing between active and passive death); see infra Part V.B.3
(comparing physician-assisted suicide with "attorney-assisted suicide").
304. Milner, supra note 279, at 327 (noting that punishment is a difference in the issues
facing the client and the patient).
305. Id. at 322 (noting that "the differences that do exist between these individuals are not
dispositive in determining that they should be treated differently").
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considering volunteering, death is imminent. All human beings, as sentient
creatures, know that they shall some day die, but the condemned inmate and the
terminal patient view death quite differently than the rest of us. Death, for
them, is no distant specter. Death is very real and is close enough to glimpse.
Terminal patients, as "terminal," know to expect death within six or twelve
months.3 °6 Condemned prisoners know that death by lethal injection, electric
chair, hanging, gas chamber, or firing squad waits on the other side of the
appeals process.3 °7 Their executions may be years away, but many condemned
men wake in the morning and go to sleep at night knowing the date upon which
they are scheduled to die.30 8 Yet deaths do not always occur as expected.
Diseases sometimes go into remission, and death row sentences can be
modified by grants of clemency. 3°9 After demonstrating that they were wrongly
convicted, some death row prisoners (even those who came precariously close
to execution) have even been freed from prison and returned to their
communities.
3 10
Death is imminent for both the condemned prisoner and the terminal
patient, but not equally so. This seems like a significant distinction. After all,
to be eligible for physician-assisted suicide, Oregon patients must have a life
306. See Drickamer, supra note 196, at 148-49 (providing one definition of "terminally ill"
as "having an incurable or irreversible condition that has a high probability of causing death
within a relatively short period of time with or without treatment [one year]" and providing a
definition of "terminal disease" as "an incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically
confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six months").
307. See L. KAY GILLESPIE, INSIDE THE DEATH CHAMBER: EXPLORING EXECUTIONS 51-69
(2003) (describing the five methods of execution available in the United States).
308. District Attorney for Suffolk District v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1292 (Mass. 1980)
("A condemned man knows, subject to the possibility of successful appeal or commutation, the
time and manner of his death. His thoughts about death must necessarily be focused more
precisely than other people's. He must wait for a specific death, not merely expect death in the
abstract.").
309. See ROBERT M. BOHM, DEATHQUEST H, at 179 (2d ed., 2003) (identifying three kinds
of clemency: reprieve [staying an execution], commutation [substituting a lesser punishment for
death], and pardon [an "erasing" of the crime]). In 1972, the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Furman commuted the sentences of those who were on death row, and in 2002,
Governor George Ryan commuted the sentences of all those on Illinois's death row. Monica
Davey & Steve Mills, Illinois Governor Sweeps Inmates from Death Row, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Jan. 12, 2003, at Al. But Bohm refers to the "illusive hope of clemency" for a very good
reason. BOHM, supra at 178. "While prior to 1970, governors in death penalty states 'routinely
commuted up to a third of the death sentences that they reviewed,"' that rate has plummeted to
"about one death sentence per year (in the entire country)." Id. at 180.
310. See, e.g., MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN: THm NEAR-EXEcUTION OF EARL
WASHINGTON JR. 208-09 (2003) (describing the return of death row inmate Earl Washington Jr.
to his community).
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expectancy of less than six months, 311 while the mean duration on death row
from sentencing to execution exceeds ten years.312 But the ten-year average on
death row is a product of the protracted capital appeals process. Volunteers
often move expeditiously from death row to the death chamber. There were
only 186 days between Timothy McVeigh's notification of the court that he
wished to waive his appeals and his execution;313 for Robert Smith, there were
only 566 days between his sentencing and execution, and only ninety-eight
days between his (compulsory and unwaivable) appellate review and
execution.314 Thus, in terms of proximity to death, the terminal patient and the
volunteer are not so very different.
The role of punishment, identified by Milner,315 seems like another
apparently meaningful distinction between the terminal patient and the death
row prisoner. Yet here, too, the patient and the prisoner are not as different as
they might seem. Though it may be tempting to demonize death row inmates as
311. OR. REv. STAT. § 127.800(12) (2003) (defining "terminal disease" as "an incurable
and irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical
judgment, produce death within six months"); id. § 127.805 (permitting a patient suffering from
a terminal disease to request assisted suicide in writing); see supra note 306 (defining "terminal
disease").
312. See THOMAS P. BONCZAR & TRAcY L. SNELL, CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT, 2003, at 11
(2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp03.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2005)
(reporting an average of 131 months from sentencing to execution in 2003).
313. Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh wrote a statement on Dec. 7, 2000,
foregoing all appellate remedies. He also asked to be executed within 120 days of filing the
statement. Statement of Timothy McVeigh Regarding Notice of Intent to Forego Further
Appeals, http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/mcveighaffl.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2005).
His attorneys conveyed his wishes to the court on Dec. 11, 2000. Id. The court granted
McVeigh's request on Dec. 28, 2000. Ed Halloran, Judge Grants Bomber's Request to Stop
Appeals, http://courttv.com/news/2000/1228/mcveigh-ctv.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2005). The
Bureau of Prisons set a May 16, 2001 date for his execution. Federal Officials Set May
Execution Date for McVeigh, http://courttv.com/news/2001/0117/mcveigh-ap.html (last visited
Mar. 8, 2005). But after it was revealed that the government had failed to disclose exculpatory
documents during McVeigh's trial, Attorney General John Ashcroft delayed the execution until
June 11, 2001. Timothy McVeigh Timeline, CNN http://www.cnn.comlCNN/Programs/people/
shows/ mcveigh/timeline.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2005). McVeigh was put to death at 7:14
a.m. on June 11 th by lethal injection in Terre Haute, Indiana. Id. He was the first person to be
executed by the federal government in 38 years. Supra note 5. Exactly 186 days (six months
and four days) lapsed between the date upon which McVeigh drafted his waiver and the date
upon which he was put to death.
314. For a discussion of the Robert A. Smith case, see supra Part III.C. For the dates of
Smith's sentencing, appellate review, and execution, see supra notes 156-57 and accompanying
text. In terms of years, 566 days equals one year, six months, and seventeen days. In terms of
months, ninety-eight days is only three months and six days.
315. See Milner, supra note 279, at 327 (noting punishment as a distinguishing factor
between patients and prisoners).
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deserving whatever they get, and though it may be tempting to beatify terminal
patients as innocents victimized by fate, a philosophical analysis of "just
deserts" is more complicated than that. Not everyone on death row is a
monster. Not everyone is even guilty.316 Even among the guilty, not all are
equally culpable: Some death row inmates were under the influence of drugs
when they committed their crimes, and others were mentally ill. Some were
juveniles, and others were mentally handicapped.317  Conversely, not all
terminal patients are altogether innocent. Some terminally-ill patients are
causally responsible, either in whole or in part, for their conditions. Some of
those dying of lung cancer smoked two packs a day; some of those dying of
AIDS contracted the HIV virus from shooting narcotics with dirty hypodermics.
In a very real sense, those who contracted HIV from shooting up with an
infected needle "caused" their diseases via illegal conduct. "The only
differences are that the conduct was not murder, and that it was not tried in the
legal system," Milner notes, "[and] these differences should not be
dispositive.
3 18
There is one other way in which a terminal illness and a pending execution
are analogous: Both the dying patient and the condemned prisoner suffer
terribly. Anticipating death, they are keenly susceptible to feelings of
depression and hopelessness and are confronted with stark end-of-life
decisions. The terminally-ill patient suffers from a physical ailment and may be
forced to endure symptoms like physical pain, nausea, loss of appetite, and
insomnia. Through good palliative care, doctors and nurses can do a great deal
to alleviate the terminal patient's physical symptoms. The suffering of the
death row prisoner, on the other hand, is situational, not corporeal in nature.
They also suffer, but from isolation, confined spaces, uncertainty, and sensory
316. See generally STANLEY COHEN, THE WRONG MEN: AMERICA'S EPIEMIC OF
WRONGFuL DEATH Row CONVICTIONS (2003) (identifying 102 cases where death row inmates
were exonerated and often proved to be innocent of the crimes for which they had been
convicted); MICHAEL L. RADELET E7 AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOuS CONVICrIONS IN
CAPrAL CASES (1994) (tracing about 400 capital cases of wrongful conviction); BARRY SCHECK
E7 AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE
WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000) (describing the release of ten wrongly-convicted prisoners).
317. The execution ofjuveniles and the mentally retarded are among the most controversial
practices associated with the death penalty. In 2002, the United States Supreme Court
concluded that it violates the Eighth Amendment to execute the mentally retarded (i.e., those
with an IQ score of seventy or below). Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.4, 321 (2002).
In March 2005, the Court held that executing offenders who were juveniles when they
committed their offenses also violated the Eighth Amendment. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005).
318. Milner, supra note 279, at 327-28.
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deprivation.319 While, in theory, something might be done to alleviate the
suffering of the death row prisoner, there is little incentive to do so in the field
of corrections. After all, conventional wisdom teaches that condemned
prisoners are the "worst of the worst '3 20 and deserve whatever they get. The
collective heart of the public bleeds for one group (patients) and hardens
against the other (prisoners), but both groups suffer. Thus, for purposes of the
analysis, terminal illness and pending execution are analogous.
3. Physician-Assisted Suicide or Withdrawal of Treatment?
Attorneys are analogous to physicians, and execution is analogous to
illness, but one important question remains. When a condemned prisoner
volunteers for execution, is it more akin to physician-assisted suicide (which is
forbidden under AMA ethics) or to withdrawal of treatment (which is permitted
under AMA ethics)? A great deal depends upon this answer. If the situation is
analogous to physician-assisted suicide, then the AMA's prohibition would
suggest that--despite the ambiguity of the Model Rules-it is unethical for an
attorney to participate in a client's waiver of appeals. But if the situation is
analogous to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, medical ethics would
suggest that the attorney not only may assist the client, but must do so. It is a
subtle distinction, and one without ethical significance in the eyes of some,
321
but how the situation is characterized determines what is permissible.
In some ways, a death row prisoner volunteering for execution seems more
like withdrawal of treatment than physician-assisted suicide. It seems passive.
"Terminal illness and terminal sentence are analogous; letting a preexisting
medical condition run its course is no more passive than allowing a preexisting
jury sentence to run its course. 3 22 In the same way that a physician may
permissibly withdraw a feeding tube and allow the patient's death to occur, an
attorney may permissibly withdraw a habeas petition and allow the prisoner's
execution. In both cases, death is foreseeable but occurs through the course of
normal events.323
319. See infra notes 344-56 and accompanying text (describing conditions on death row).
320. See supra note 175 (discussing the concept of the "worst of the worst").
321. See Rachels, supra note 193, at 79-80 (arguing that active euthanasia is no worse than
passive euthanasia).
322. Milner, supra note 279, at 325.
323. The whole notion that death occurs "naturally" when a patient foregoes life-sustaining
treatment merits more careful consideration. When a terminal patient instructs the physician to
withdraw a life-sustaining ventilator and dies when the device is removed, we tend to say that
death was a product of the disease. See Milner, supra note 279, at 325 (discussing the
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One, however, can argue that the situation is more analogous to
physician-assisted suicide than withdrawal of treatment. The AMA prohibits
physician-assisted suicide not because the doctor acts in some affirmative
manner to end the patient's life,324 but because providing a patient with
information or access to lethal medication remains fundamentally
inconsistent with the physician's duty of beneficence. 325 An equivalent
principle of beneficence also compels the attorney. 326 Accordingly, this
principle appears to prohibit the lawyer from providing the client with
information about how to end his life or with the means to do so. The lawyer
who aids a volunteering client in waiving appeals not only strays from the
polestar duty of beneficence, but takes an affirmative step in harming the
client.
The situation might equate to withdrawal of treatment when the lawyer
either withdraws or is dismissed by the client, the former client then waives
327his appeals, and the former attorney does nothing to prevent the execution.
That might comport with the AMA's policy on end-of-life decisions. 328 But
when the attorney affirmatively champions the client's cause, arguing for the
circumstances under which society accepts physicians' actions that ultimately lead to the death
of the patient and those under which society does not). But if the patient said she wanted to
remain alive and instructed the doctor to use the ventilator, and if the doctor then removed the
ventilator, it is unlikely that we would say that her death was the product of the disease. See id.
at 326 (same). We would be more likely to say the doctor caused her death, even though it
involved nothing more than the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. See id. (same).
324. This would be euthanasia. See Rachels, supra note 193, at 78 (defining euthanasia).
325. AM. MED. Ass'N., CODE OF MEDICALETHiCS E-2.211 (2004-05) ("Physician assisted
suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the physician's role as healer.").
326. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCoNDuCTR. 1.3 cmt. 1 (1999) (stating that
"[a] lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition... " and that "a
lawyer should act with commitment... to the interests of a client and with zeal in advocacy
upon the client's behalf").
327. These were the circumstances surrounding the representation of Robert A. Smith. See
supra Part III.C (containing a case study of Smith v. State). Smith's attorneys, Smock and
Etling, refused to sign Smith's negotiated plea agreement. See Smith v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1264,
1267 (Ind. 1997) (describing how attorneys refused to sign a plea "agreement or a death
sentence penalty when a 'lesser punishment' has been offered"). After a competency hearing
and a hearing "to determine whether Smith could proceed pro se," Smock and Etling were
dismissed as counsel but retained as stand-by counsel. Id. at 1269. Once Smith was sentenced
to death, the court appointed them as counsel for the appeal. Id. When Smith requested to
represent himself on appeal, Smock and Etling opposed his motion. Id. at 1270. When the
court ruled in Smith's favor, Smock and Etling were appointed as amicus. Id.
328. See AM. MED. ASS'N, HEALTH AND SCIENCE POLICIES OF THE AMA HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 192-93 (H-140.966), available at www.ama-assn.org/ad-com/polfind/hlth-
ethics.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) (outlining AMA policy on end-of-life decisions).
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client's death in court, 29 drafting waivers of appellate rights, or even
delivering such documents on the client's behalf, the attorney affirmatively
assists the client in ending his life. This is lawyer-assisted suicide.
331
While lawyers who believe that client autonomy should trump other ethical
considerations may find these affirmative actions agreeable,332 they
subordinate the duty of beneficence to a level that, at least within the field
of medical ethics, would be impermissible.
Medical ethics can provide meaningful guidance to the attorney
confronted with the dilemma of the volunteering client. The AMA's
bright-line prohibition against euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide
can serve as a compass for the lawyer seeking to navigate the labyrinth of
capital ethics. The role of the physician and the role of the attorney are
sufficiently analogous to warrant this step, and terminal illness and pending
execution are sufficiently analogous to justify the comparison. While
reasonable people could differ about whether the volunteering client is
better analogized to withdrawal of treatment than physician-assisted
suicide, the lawyer's agency in waiving appellate rights implies that
physician-assisted suicide is a better analog. Thus, to the extent that one
can apply medical ethics to the legal proceedings of a volunteering client,
the fundamental principle of beneficence bars the lawyer from aiding the
client in waiving appeals. But even those who remain unconvinced that the
principle of "primum non nocere" should also apply to lawyers should
understand that another reason exists as to why death row lawyers should
be extraordinarily reluctant to honor the volunteer's request: torture.
329. See Hansen, supra note 63, at 22 (describing Jamie McAllister's demand that her
client, Douglas Alan Smith, be given the death penalty).
330. See Statement of Timothy McVeigh Regarding Notice of Intent to Forego Further
Appeals, supra note 313 (reproducing documents from counsel for Timothy McVeigh).
331. See Mello, supra note 42, at 48-49, 62-64 (describing "attorney-assisted suicide");
see also Lenhard ex rel. Bishop v. Wolft, 444 U.S. 807, 815 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(noting Justice Marshall's characterization of the defendant's waiver of appeal as "state-
administered suicide").
332. See supra Part H.D (describing the autonomy-based thinking of client-centered
lawyers).
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C. The Torture of Being
The brutality and savagery of America's prisons is well-documented.333
Yet even against the background of notorious institutions such as Corcoran,334
Florence,335 Marion,336 and Pelican Bay,337 death row is acknowledged as the
hardest time that a prisoner can do.338 It subjects a prisoner to such oppressive
and dehumanizing conditions that the New York Bar Association has
characterized it as "dying twice. 3 39 The physical environment of death row is
severe, and it unquestionably contributes to the suffering of death row inmates.
But the psychological aspects of death row are even more corrosive and-when
combined with the austere physical environment--can "press the outer bounds
333. See, e.g., PAUL KEVE, PRISON LIFE AND HUMAN WORTH 54 (1974) ("Prison is a barely
controlled jungle where the aggressive and the strong will exploit the weak, and the weak are
dreadfully aware of it."); Oleson, supra note 113, at 849-61 (describing modem prisons as
"animal factories" and recounting the endemic problems of suicide, aggression, rape, and
torture).
334. See Oleson, supra note 113, at 854-58 (describing reports of Corcoran's gladiator
fights and coordinated rapes); J.C. Oleson, Corcoran Prison, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRISONS
AND CORRECTIONAL FACILrrIES 180, 180-82 (Mary Bosworth ed., 2005) [hereinafter
ENCYCLOPEDIA] (same).
335. See David Ward, ADX (administrative maximum): Florence, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA,
supra note 334, at 15, 15-18 (describing conditions of confinement).
336. See Stephen Richards, Marion U.S. Penitentiary, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 334,
at 569, 569-72 (describing conditions of confinement).
337. See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1155, 1160-1240 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(describing conditions at Pelican Bay); Sally Mann Romano, Comment, If the SHU Fits: Cruel
and Unusual Punishment at California's Pelican Bay State Prison, 45 EMORY L.J. 1089, 1089-
93, 1098-1104 (1996) (describing the cramped, isolated conditions at Pelican Bay); Benjamin
Steiner, Pelican Bay State Prison, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 334, at 686, 686-88
(describing Pelican Bay as a place of silence illuminated by little natural light).
338. See ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF THE MODERN ExECurION PROCESS
63-64,70-74,80-87,92-113 (2d ed. 1998) (comparing the life of an inmate on death row to an
existence "not much higher than that of a maggot"). He stated:
[D]eath row is the most total of total institutions, the penitentiary most demanding
of penitence, the prison most debilitating and disabling in its confinement. On
death row the allegorical pound of flesh is just the beginning. Here the whole
person is consumed. The spirit is captured and gradually worn down, then the body
is disposed of....
Id. at 71.
339. See generally David S. Hammer et al., Dying Twice: Conditions on New York's
Death Row, 22 PACE L. REv. 347 (2002) (noting that keeping the lights on to prevent suicide
may have the unintended result of increasing the likelihood of prisoners committing the very
act). The title of the article comes from an Albert Camus quote: "[A] man is undone by waiting
for capital punishment well before he dies. Two deaths are inflicted upon him, the first being
worse than the second ...." Id. at 349.
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of what most humans can psychologically tolerate. 340 Under these conditions,
life itself may become unendurable, a form of torture from which the
condemned prisoner seeks to escape.34' It may sound hyperbolic to describe the
conditions on death row as "torture"-prison, after all, is supposed to be
"punishment"342-but unfortunately, ample empirical evidence substantiates
this characterization of death row.
3 43
Super-maximum prison facilities serve as the model of most death row
facilities.344 They segregate condemned prisoners from the general prison
340. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1267.
341. See, e.g., Miller v. Stewart, 231 F.3d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing how a
prisoner preferred death to incarceration in a supermax facility); Groseclose ex rel. Harries v.
Dutton, 594 F. Supp. 949, 959-61 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (finding a prisoner's guilty plea and
request for expedited execution were brought on by conditions of solitary confinement on death
row); State v. Creech, 710 P.2d 502, 509 (Idaho 1985) (citing a letter written by a condemned
prisoner indicating that his guilty plea and request for expedited execution had been caused by a
wish to escape extended solitary confinement).
342. See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87
CAL. L. REv. 943, 980 (1999) (quoting California's Penal Code: "The Legislature finds and
declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment").
343. See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1264 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("[Iff the particular
conditions of segregation... are such that they inflict a serious mental illness, greatly
exacerbate mental illness, or deprive inmates of their sanity, then [prison officials] have
deprived inmates of a basic necessity of human existence ... [and] have crossed into the realm
of psychological torture."); see also Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1046 n.* (1995) (mem.)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing long stays on death row as "psychological torture");
State v. Miller, 111 P.2d 1053, 1053-55 (Wash. 1910) (describing circumstances in which
solitary confinement becomes "torture"); Christine Rebman, Comment, The Eighth Amendment
and Solitary Confinement: The Gap in Protection from Psychological Consequences, 49
DEPAuL L. REV. 567, 579 (1999) (reporting prison conditions of "mental torture").
344. See Oleson, ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 334, at 214, 214-17 ("The physical
environment of death row closely resembles that of super-maximum secure facilities.").
Supermax prisons, in turn, are modeled on the regime at Marion. See Craig Haney & Mona
Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary
Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 477, 489-90 (1997) (describing how the
"Federal Bureau of Prisons [has] committed itself to the continuation of the Control Unit
philosophy"); see also Richards, supra note 336, at 572 (stating that Marion is a "blueprint for
building super-secure federal and state facilities" and that it is harsher than some death row
facilities). For a brief overview of supermax confinement, see Oleson, supra note 113, at 849-
61. The author stated:
In supermax facilities, inmates are entombed within solitary cells of about seven by
twelve feet (slightly larger than a king-sized bed) bound by seven layers of steel and
cement. The spartan furniture (for example, a stool, a writing desk, and a mattress
pedestal) is made of poured concrete in order to prevent prisoners from fashioning
weapons out of metal parts. Inmates are often confined within their tiny one-man
cells for twenty-three hours per day; they only get one hour of exercise (in an even-
smaller outdoor cage that is attached to the rear of their cell). This hour is also
spent in solitude.
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population, house them in cramped cells, subject them to continuous
surveillance, and afford them only limited visiting privileges. Illinois' Tamms
Correctional Center confines prisoners in cells that are seventy square feet
(smaller than eight feet by nine feet), and this modest space contains "a toilet, a
sink, a desk, a bed, storage for personal items, and an outside window.
3 45
Arizona and New York have comparably sized cells for condemned men.3 6
Because it is difficult to comprehend what living in a seventy square foot area
would actually be like, one educator suggests that students try locking
themselves in a bathroom for forty-eight hours.347
In reality, guards occasionally permit condemned prisoners to leave their
cells. The prisoners may take showers (typically one to three of them per
week); they may exercise (typically between one and three hours per week).348
But exercise periods do not consist of spirited games of touch football on the
prison yard. Rather, condemned prisoners are placed inside a wire mesh "dog
run" and allowed to exercise in the same way that they live: isolated and
alone.349 All exercise is solitary.35 ° Perhaps because prisoners must submit to a
visual strip search in order to go outside, many forego even this indulgence.351
Id. at 859 n.161 (citations omitted).
345. See Rebman, supra note 343, at 568 (describing conditions in Tamms Correctional
Center).
346. See Hammer et al., supra note 339, at 356 (describing living area as about seventy-
eight square feet); Robert M. Ferrier, Note, "An Atypical and Significant Hardship": The
Supermax Confinement of Death Row Prisoners Based Purely on Status-A Plea for
Procedural Due Process, 46 ARIZ. L. REv. 291, 294 (2004) (comparing cells in Arizona State
Prison Complex Eyman to the seven by twelve foot cells used in Marion).
347. See GILLESPIE, supra note 307, at 43 (following up on the question, "Could you live in
a ten- by six-foot cell for twenty-three out of twenty-four hours?" by suggesting this experiment:
"Lock yourself in your bathroom for forty-eight hours. You can take anything in with you that
you wish-but you cannot leave or have visitors. Keep a journal-making entries at least two
or three times an hour.").
348. See Ferrier, supra note 346, at 295 ("In Arizona, prisoners are allowed out for three
thirty-minute showers a week. They are also allowed an exercise period three times a week for
an hour."); Hammer et al., supra note 339, at 356 ("The men ... are allowed three showers per
week, in open stainless steel stalls without curtains."); id. at 359 ("[Prisoners are] allowed to
exercise daily for one hour .. "); Rebman, supra note 343, at 571 ("[Slhowers are limited to
once per week for disciplinary segregation and twice per week for administrative detention" and
"inmates are guaranteed only a minimum of one hour per week of exercise in the yard.").
349. See Ferrier, supra note 346, at 295 (describing a wire mesh exercise enclosure slightly
larger than the prisoner's cell); Rebman, supra note 343, at 571 ("The 10' x 20' concrete box
hardly serves its purpose as an exercise yard. High walls and a partially covered concrete and
mesh ceiling provide the only view to the outside.").
350. See Hammer et al., supra note 339, at 359 (describing the exercise yard as a "dog run"
of about 2,000 square feet).
351. See Ferrier, supra note 346, at 295 (describing procedures when prisoners exercise in
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Condemned prisoners live under continuous surveillance in a modem
panopticon. 3 ' Everything a death row prisoner does is subject to monitoring:
guards monitor him when he exercises, visits with his family, uses the toilet,
showers, and sleeps. Indeed, death row has such a committment to high-tech
monitoring that prison cells remain illuminated twenty-four hours per day.
Some prisoners complain that they cannot sleep because of the lights and that
correctional officers thwart their attempts to block out the light.
353
Condemned prisoners may have visits, but only limited ones. Only blood-
relatives, legal counsel, and clergy may visit, and Illinois prisoners have only
one personal visit per month.354 There is no contact visitation. Visitors remain
separated from prisoners by a thick sheet of Plexiglas® and communicate by
telephone. 355  In New York's Unit for Condemned Persons (the "UCP"),
lawyers have noted that the "phones do not function properly and that inmates
must speak very loudly, or even yell, to be heard through the Plexiglas®
shield. 3 56 To get a sense of what a visit might be like, imagine trying to
conduct a privileged legal conversation with a client through the glass screen
used by all-night service stations and box offices.
In addition to one personal visit per month, condemned prisoners might
receive one ten-minute phone call per week.357 One monthly visit, one weekly
call: that constitutes the extent of their interaction with other human beings.
They spend the rest of their lives in isolation, boxed in a cell the size of a
bathroom, left with little or nothing to do. It is live burial.
What happens to a prisoner's mind when he is entombed within a seventy
square foot universe?358 In 1999, the National Institute of Corrections wrote
supermax facilities).
352. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DiscipiNE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200
(Vintage Book 2d ed. 1995) (Alan Sheridan trans., 1979) (describing the architecture of the
panopticon envisioned by Jeremy Bentham: all the prison's cells would be constructed around a
central guard post, and by observing silhouettes cast by light coming into cells from the outside
windows, a single guard would be able to monitor an entire prison).
353. See Hammer et al., supra note 339, at 364 (reporting that one prisoner "tries to sleep
by putting his head under his blanket" and noting that "the strategy is often ineffective since the
officers wake him up and require that he uncover his head").
354. See Rebman, supra note 343, at 571 (noting that the monthly visit is limited to two
hours); Hammer et al., supra note 339, at 357 (reporting that New York's condemned prisoners
are allowed one non-legal visit per week).
355. See Hammer et al., supra note 339, at 358 (describing non-legal and legal visitation).
356. Id.
357. See id. (noting that prisoners are limited to one ten-minute telephone call per week).
358. See Woodburn Heron, The Pathology of Boredom, Sci. AM., Jan. 1957, at 52, 53-55
(finding that subjects confined to an experimental cubicle under conditions of confinement more
restrictive than those on death row exhibited marked cognitive effects after only ninety-six
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that "[l]ittle is known about the impact of locking an inmate in an isolated cell
for an average of 23 hours per day with limited human interaction, little
constructive activity, and an environment that assures maximum control over
the individual. " 359 This statement is inaccurate. Our understanding about the
effects of isolation stretches all the way back to Charles Darwin and Alexis de
Tocqueville. 360 In 1910, the Washington Supreme Court wrote:
The effect of solitary confinement on the mind of a person charged with a
crime may be imagined. It is a well-known psychological fact that men and
women have frequently confessed to crimes they did not commit. They
have done it sometimes to escape punishment which had become torture to
them .... 361
Clinical research has borne out these preliminary findings, and the results
are unsettling. Stuart Grassian interviewed fifteen prisoners who were kept in
solitary confinement in Massachusetts's Walpole State Prison. 362 The Walpole
prisoners were initially cavalier about their isolation, but as their bravado
yielded to candor, "Dr. Grassian found that the inmates' earlier statements
reflected a denial of the mind-altering conditions and gave way to troubling
descriptions of mental torture. 3 63 Grassian found that more than two-thirds
had experienced free-floating anxiety and hypersensitivity to external stimuli
(often associated with sensory deprivation); half reported perceptual distortions
(including auditory and visual hallucinations) or serious interference with
cognitive processes (e.g., confusion, difficulty concentrating, or lapses in
memory).364 A third of the group experienced feelings of paranoia, difficulty
with impulse control (sometimes involving self-mutilation), and uncontrollable
"fantasies of revenge, torture, and mutilation of the prison guards."
365
hours).
359. CHASE R1VELAND, NAT'LINST. OFCORRS., U.S. DEP'T. OFJUSTICE, SUPERMAX PRISONS:
OVERVmW AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 2 (1999).
360. See Stuart Grassian, Psychopathological Effects of Solitary Confinement, 140 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1450, 1450-51 (1983) (describing the concerns about solitary confinement
articulated by Darwin and Tocqueville).
361. Washington v. Miller, Ill P. 1053, 1054 (Wash. 1910).
362. See Grassian, supra note 360, at 1452-54 (describing Walpole study); Haney &
Lynch, supra note 344, at 521 (same).
363. Rebman, supra note 343, at 579.
364. See Grassian, supra note 360, at 1452 (reporting results of the Walpole study). These
symptoms are consistent with the responses documented in Heron's study of sensory
deprivation. See Heron, supra note 358, at 52 (relating the psychological consequences of
solitary confinement).
365. Grassian, supra note 360, at 1453.
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Later, when Stuart Grassian and Craig Haney interviewed prisoners in
Pelican Bay's Secure Housing Unit (SHU), they reported a comparable
constellation of pathological symptoms. 366 More than forty percent of the
prisoners suffered from perceptual distortions and hallucinations; more than
seventy percent suffered from mood swings, emotional flatness, and chronic
depression; and more than eighty percent were plagued by ruminations,
confused thought processes, hypersensitivity to stimuli, and irrational anger.
367
Some of these symptoms were mild, but many were not. More than one
prisoner in Pelican Bay reported seeing-and fighting against-demons.
368
I still have trouble with entities and demons--evil spirits-comic books I
read are about the antichrist. I can see them through the walls, black evil.
Used to be real heavy. If you pay attention to them, you give in. Mostly it
is the devil-no doubt about it .... Got to fight back .... 69
Robert Ferrier understated the matter when he wrote, "Haney and Grassian had
uncovered an ugly secret. 3 70 Yet while the corrosive effects of isolation and
deprivation were horrible in Walpole's solitary confinement cells and in Pelican
Bay's SHU, things are even worse, psychologically speaking, on death row.
One commentator wrote bluntly, "Condemned inmates face far greater
psychological stress. 3 7 1 In addition to the austere environment, the death row
prisoner lives with the horror of knowing how and when he will die.372 The
condemned man knows that on the morning of his execution, correctional
officers he has known for a decade will lead him to a chamber where, before an
366. See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1223-37 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (reporting SHU
prisoners' varied mental disorders).
367. Id. at 1234 n.173 (reporting the results from Dr. Haney's survey of 100 randomly-
selected SHU prisoners).
368. Id. at 1233-34 (describing symptoms of Inmates 2 and 4).
369. Id. at 1233 (quoting Inmate 2).
370. Ferrier, supra note 346, at 300.
371. Id.
372. See Suffolk County v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1292 (Mass. 1980) ("[A condemned
man] must wait for a specific death, not merely expect death in the abstract .. "). In his
formidable essay, Reflections on the Guillotine, Albert Camus rejected the notion that the
execution, by trading an eye for an eye, re-established parity between the murderer and the
victim. The two situations were not equivalent because the condemned man not only forfeits his
life, but also suffers, indefinitely, in a suspended state of horror while awaiting his death.
Camus wrote:
For there to be equivalence, the death penalty would have to punish a criminal who
had warned his victim of the date at which he would inflict a horrible death on him
and who, from that moment onward, had confined him at his mercy for months.
Such a monster is not encountered in private life.
ALBERT CAMUS, RESISTANCE, REBEuION, AND DEATH 199 (1961).
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audience of ghouls, he will be ceremonially put down like a stray dog. The
certainty of execution is an excruciating psychological burden.37 3 But in many
ways, the uncertainty of death row is even worse.374 Even the United States
Supreme Court has recognized this fact, noting that "when a prisoner sentenced
by a court to death is confined in the penitentiary awaiting the execution of the
sentence, one of the most horrible feelings to which he can be subjected during
that time is the uncertainty during the whole of it.
375
Today, condemned prisoners may be required to endure that crushing
sense of uncertainty for a decade or more. 376 Ten years, alone, in a cell the size
of a bathroom. Ten years, and for companionship, only hopelessness,
uncertainty, and demons in the walls. Numerous commentators have suggested
that the protracted durations that condemned prisoners now spend on death row
should give rise to a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim.377 While this has
been dismissed as brazen chutzpah by some,378 the argument was considered in
373. In his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Rector v. Bryant, Justice Stevens
recognized that many individuals on death row suffered from serious mental illness before they
committed their crimes and acknowledged "that many more develop such impairments during
the excruciating interval between sentencing and execution." Rector v. Bryant, 501 U.S. 1239,
1243 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
374. See Reed, supra note 35, at Al (quoting Michael Laurence as saying, "The people on
death row fear uncertainty more than they fear death. It is the uncertainty of the process, how it
works, what to expect, as well as what the final result is going to be.").
375. In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890).
376. See BONCZAR & SNELL, supra note 312, at 11 (reporting an average 131 months
between sentencing and execution).
377. See, e.g., Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and
Execution Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment? 29 SEToN HALL L. REv. 147, 210-12
(1998) (arguing that a delayed execution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); Richard E.
Shugrue, A Fate Worse Than Death-An Essay on Whether Long Times on Death Row are
Cruel Times, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1, 24 (1995) (same); Michael P. Connolly, Note, Better
Never Than Late: Prolonged Stays on Death Row Violate the Eighth Amendment, 23 NEW ENG.
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 101, 137-38 (1997) (same); Jessica Feldman, Comment, A
Death Row Incarceration Calculus: When Prolonged Death Row Imprisonment Becomes
Unconstitutional, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 187, 219 (1999) (same); Kathleen M. Flynn, Note,
The "Agony of Suspense": How Protracted Death Row Confinement Gives Rise to an Eighth
Amendment Claim of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 291, 332-33
(1997) (same); Ryan S. Hedges, Note, Justices Blind: How the Rehnquist Court's Refusal To
Hear a Claim for Inordinate Delay of Execution Undermines Its Death Penalty Jurisprudence,
74 S. CAL. L. REv. 577, 613-15 (2001) (same).
378. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence,
46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1,25 (1995) ("It is somewhat akin to the classic definition of chutzpah
for death penalty opponents to say we can't execute someone too fast because he is entitled to a
searching review, and then to say what we are doing is immoral when we delay the execution
precisely to afford such review."). But see Ronald Dworkin, Editorial, The Court's Impatience
To Execute, L.A. TMES, July 11, 1999, at Ml (noting that the Supreme Court has become
impatient and that super-due process has turned into process-lite). Dworkin reasoned:
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sympathetic terms in Justice Stevens's dissent from the denial of certiorari in
Lackey v. Texas.
379
In Lackey, Justice Stevens (joined by Justice Breyer) acknowledged the
novelty of the claim, noted its legal complexity, and wrote that it had
potentially far-reaching consequences. 380 He noted that after seventeen years on
death row, an execution might no longer advance the penological justifications
of retribution and deterrence, and he also noted that many penologists and
medical experts agreed that a prolonged wait on death row constitutes
"psychological torture. 381 Finally, Justice Stevens observed that the highest
courts in other nations had found similar arguments to be persuasive and often
382had commuted death sentences. Justice Stevens's view did not prevail,
however. The Court denied certiorari, and on May 20, 1997, Clarence Lackey
was executed in Texas.
383
Since Lackey, the Court has repeatedly passed up opportunities to
reconsider the claim of inordinate delay. In a 1998 dissent from the denial of
certiorari in Elledge v. Florida,3 4 Justice Breyer argued that the petitioner's
twenty-three years on death row was unusual (whether under contemporary
standards or those of the Framers) and argued that such an inordinate delay was
also cruel (whether evaluated by indicia of domestic penology or by judicial
practices in foreign jurisdictions).385 But again, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari.386 In his 1999 dissent from the denial of certiorari in Knight v.
What if we cannot tolerate all the stays and appeals and retrials that a decent respect
for human life requires without making the law seem foolish and without
subverting the point of a death sentence... ? Then we must abandon capital
punishment, even if we think it right in principle, because then we cannot have it,
even if it is right, without cheating.
Id.
379. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (mem.) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
380. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
381. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
382. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
383. Clarence Lackey: Last Statement (2005), http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/lackey
clarencelast.htm.
384. Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
385. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
386. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). William Elledge remains alive on Florida's death row.
FLORIDA DEP'T OF CORRS., DEATH Row ROSTER (2005), http://www.dc.state.fl.us/active
inmates/deathrowroster.asp. Elledge was received by the Florida Department of Corrections on
April 16, 1975, and was sentenced to death on August 3, 1977. Id. As of January 2006, more
than twenty-eight years and seven months have lapsed since William Elledge was sentenced to
death.
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Florida,387 Justice Breyer raised the same arguments articulated in Lackey and
Elledge. Again, he indicated that many Commonwealth nations had
acknowledged the claim, and he argued that the Court should address the issue
because increasing numbers of condemned prisoners are facing twenty or more
years on death row.388
But in his concurrence in the denial of certiorari, Justice Thomas indicated
some of the reasons why the Court might not want to address the issue of
inordinate delay.389 Justice Thomas observed that the intolerable delays
associated with Lackey claims are the by-product of the Court's "Byzantine
death penalty jurisprudence, '30 9 and argued that it is "incongruous" to arm
defendants with an arsenal of constitutional claims with which to delay their
executions and then to complain when their executions are inevitably
delayed. 39' He also noted that ever since Justice Stevens invited the state and
lower courts to serve as laboratories for the viability of the claim, the courts had
"resoundingly rejected the claim as meritless. '3 92 Accordingly, he urged the
Court to "consider the experiment concluded.
3 93
Justice Thomas, however, may have been premature in his
pronouncement: the experiment is not yet over. 394 The legal debate about
inordinate delay has not ended, and the notion that conditions on death row
might constitute torture continues to stimulate discussion around the world.
Internationally, a great deal of this debate can be traced to a seminal 1989 case
from the European Court of Human Rights: Soering v. United Kingdom.
395
1. Case Study: Soering v. United Kingdom
The facts in Soering are, like the facts in almost all capital cases,
depressing and sad. Jens Soering, a German national, moved to the United
States with his diplomat father when he was eleven years old. He enrolled in
387. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
388. Id. at 995-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
389. Id. at 990-93 (Thomas, J., concurring).
390. Id. at 991 (Thomas, J., concurring).
391. Id. at 992 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 378, at
25).
392. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
393. Id. at 993 (Thomas, J., concurring).
394. See id. at 999 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that "although the experiment may have
begun, it is hardly evident that we 'should consider the experiment concluded"').
395. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), reprinted in 11 EuR.
H.R. REP. 439 (1989).
218
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the University of Virginia in 1984, and there met Elizabeth Haysom, a fellow
student. They became quite close, despite her parents' strident opposition to
the relationship. Eventually, Soering and Haysom decided to kill her parents.396
To establish an alibi, they rented a car in Charlottesville and drove to
Washington, D.C. On March 30, 1985, Soering then drove alone to Haysom's
parents' home, initiated an argument with them, and attacked them with a
knife. Haysom's parents were later found dead, with multiple stab and slash
wounds on their necks and bodies.397
Soering and Haysom fled to Europe and were subsequently arrested in
England for check fraud. The United States requested extradition under its
1972 extradition treaty with the United Kingdom. Haysom did not contest
extradition, pled guilty as an accessory to the murder of her parents, and was
sentenced to ninety years in prison. 398 Lillich understated matters considerably
when he wrote, "Soering's extradition, however, proved to be more
complicated. 
3 99
Before his extradition, Soering applied for a writ of habeas corpus and
petitioned for leave to apply for judicial review. In so doing, Soering relied
upon a provision in the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty that provides:
If the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death
under the relevant law of the requesting Party, but the relevant law of the
requested Party does not provide for the death penalty in a similar case,
extradition may be refused unless the requesting Party gives assurances
satisfactory to the requested Party that the death penalty will not be carried
out.
4W
The British embassy requested an assurance from the United States that Soering
would not be executed. The Commonwealth Attorney of Bedford County,
Virginia, proffered a sworn affidavit to this effect, but Soering dismissed this as
being insufficient to satisfy Article IV of the Extradition Treaty. 4°1 While the
English Secretary of State was evaluating the case, Soering also filed an
application with the European Commission of Human Rights. 4°2 He argued
that, despite assurances from United States authorities, there was a substantial
396. See Richard B. Lillich, Note, The Soering Case, 85 AM. J. INT'L. L. 128, 128 (1991)
(recounting the facts of the Soering case).
397. Id.
398. Id. at 129.
399. Id.
400. Extradition Treaty, U.S.-U.K., art. IV, June 8, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 227.
401. See Lillich, supra note 396, at 130 (summarizing the procedural history of Soering's
suit).
402. Id.
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risk that he would be executed. This, however, was insufficient to bar
Soering's extradition under the European Convention (which permits the death
penalty), so in addition, he argued that the circumstances of his case, notably
the delay between sentencing and execution in Virginia, would expose him to
"death row phenomenon" and therefore violate Article Three of the European
Convention.4 3
In a six-to-five vote, the members of the Commission determined that
extraditing Soering to the United States would not violate Article Three of the
Convention.4°4 The Commissioners concluded that England could be held
liable for Article Three violations committed by the United States and
concluded that, notwithstanding the Commonwealth Attorney's assurances and
the presence of mitigating factors, there was a serious risk that Soering would
be sentenced to death.4°5 But the Commission determined that Soering's
exposure to death row syndrome did not constitute the "inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment" prohibited by Article Three of the European
Convention.4 °6 It reached this conclusion by analyzing five factors associated
with the risk of exposure to death row syndrome: (1) delays of six to eight
years in Virginia's appellate system; (2) the possibility that Soering's age or
mental condition might not be taken into account; (3) the conditions of
confinement on Virginia's death row; (4) the execution procedure
(electrocution); and (5) the possibility that Soering could be extradited to
Germany, where the death penalty had been abolished.40 7 In its report, the
Commission concluded that the first four factors were insufficient to prove a
violation of Article Three, and that the fifth factor was irrelevant to the
analysis.a°8
After receiving the Commission's report, the European Court of Human
Rights followed a parallel line of analysis. For example, the Court first
determined that as an extraditing agent, England could be responsible for
Article Three violations committed by the United States.4°9 Then the Court
403. Id. at 130-31.
404. Id. at 131.
405. Id. at 131-34.
406. Id. at 137.
407. Id. at 134.
408. Id. at 137.
409. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 91 (1989), 11 EUR. H.R.
REP. 473. The Court ruled that:
[Tihe decision by a Contracting State to extradite a fugitive may give rise to an
issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the
Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the
person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to
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concluded that Soering faced a real risk of being sentenced to death.
41 0
When the Court came to the matter of death row syndrome, however, it
deviated from the Commission's analysis, and all eighteen judges
unanimously concluded that "taking all the circumstances together, the
treatment awaiting the applicant in Virginia would go so far beyond
treatment inevitably connected with the imposition and execution of a death
penalty as to be 'inhuman' within the meaning of Article Three., 41 1 In
making this determination, the Court assessed four factors: (1) the length
of detention prior to execution; (2) the conditions on death row;
(3) Soering's age and mental state; and (4) the possibility of extraditing
Soering to Germany.412
In light of the Court's decision, the British Government sought
binding assurances from the United States Government that Soering would
not be tried for capital murder. After these assurances were made, Soering
was extradited to Virginia, where he was convicted of first-degree murder
and sentenced to two life terms.4 13 The Soering case is important not only
because it heralded an era when America's death penalty practices had
profound extradition consequences,414 but also because it established the
concept of death row syndrome.4 5
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting country.
Id. 1 91, 11 EUR. H.R. REP., at 473.
410. Id. 93-94, 11EuR. H.R. REP., at 474-75.
411. Id. 105, 11 EUR. H.R. REP., at 480.
412. Id.9[ 106-10,11 EuR. H.R. REP., at 481.
413. See Soering v. Deeds, 499 S.E.2d 514,514-15 (Va. 1998) (describing Soering's 1990
conviction before rejecting the claim in his habeas petition that the state had failed to provide
exculpatory materials under its Brady obligation). Jens Soering remains in prison, where he has
written several books and articles about prison and spirituality. See, e.g., JENS SOERING, AN
EXPENSIVE WAY TO MAKE BAD PEOPLE WORSE: AN ESSAY ON PRISON REFORM FROM AN
INsIDER's PERSPECTIVE (2004) (critiquing American prison policy); JENS SOERING, THE WAY OF
THE PRISONER: BREAKING THE CHAINS OF SELF THROUGH CENTERING PRAYER AND CENTERING
PRACTICE (2003) (teaching meditative techniques); Jens Soering, No Way Out, WASH. CITY
PAPER, Sept. 3, 2004, at Al (recounting the prison death of child molester Richard Ausley).
414. See Lillich, supra note 396, at 145-47 (describing the impact of Soering on United
States extradition cases); see also Mark E. DeWitt, Comment, Extradition Enigma: Italy and
Human Rights vs. America and the Death Penalty, 47 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 535,565-73 (1998)
(describing Italy's refusal to extradite Pietro Venezia to the United States despite assurances
that the death penalty would not be sought).
415. See David Wallace-Wells, What Is Death Row Syndrome? And Who Came Up with
It? SLATE, Feb. 1, 2005, http://slate.msn.com/id/2112901/ (equating death row syndrome to
"death row phenomenon" conceived in the Soering case).
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2. Death Row Syndrome
"Death row syndrome" denotes the dehumanizing stress and anxiety that
attend sustained periods on death row. Like insanity or competence, 41 '6 death
row syndrome is a legal-not a medical--concept.4 7 It draws upon psychiatric
research, but it is a term of art coined by jurists, not physicians.4 8 Assuredly it
has psychological dimensions, but it is integrally linked to normative concepts
as well.419
While the concept has not gained currency in the United States,42 ° the
international community has embraced the idea of a death row syndrome.421 At
about the same time the European Court of Human Rights was deciding the
Soering case, the Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights was deciding another death row phenomenon case:
Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica.422 In Pratt and Morgan, the Committee stated
that "prolonged judicial proceedings do not per se constitute cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment even if they can be a source of mental strain for the
convicted prisoners" but that "in cases involving capital punishment... an
assessment of the circumstances of each case [is] necessary., 423  The
Committee concluded that Pratt and Morgan had failed to prove that delay
constituted cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, but the Privy Council later
overturned this decision in Pratt v. Attorney General.424 Their sentences were
416. See Part HI.A (describing competence tests).
417. Wallace-Wells, supra note 415.
418. Id.
419. See NILS CHRISTIE, CRIME CONTROL AS INDUSTRY: TOWARDS GULAGS, WESTERN
STYLE? 184 (1993) (suggesting that "the delivery of pain, to whom, and for what, contains an
endless line of deep moral questions").
420. See supra note 392 and accompanying text (noting that many lower and state courts
have rejected the legitimacy of an Eighth Amendment claim based on inordinate delay).
421. See Richard B. Lillich, Harmonizing Human Rights Law Nationally and
Internationally: The Death Row Phenomenon as a Case Study, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 699, 702-
11 (1996) (tracing the development of death row phenomenon jurisprudence).
422. Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., Supp. No.
40, at 222, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (Sept. 29, 1989).
423. Id. at 230.
424. Pratt v. Attorney General, [1993] 4 All E.R. 769 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.). The
Privy Council suggested that prisoners should be able to adjudicate their claims within eighteen
months, and recommended the rule that "in any case in which execution is to take place more
than five years after sentence there will be strong grounds for believing that the delay is such as
to constitute 'inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment."' Id. at 788-89.
Interestingly, this dictum applies not only to Jamaica, but also to Belize, Trinidad, and
Mauritius (where Privy Council decisions are binding) and to countries such as India, Malaysia,
Nigeria, and Pakistan (where Privy Council decisions are treated as "persuasive authority").
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425commuted to life imprisonment. In Kindler v. Canada, the Supreme Court
of Canada became the first national court to follow Soering as precedent.426
Although the Court held that Kindler' s extradition to the United States did not
violate the promise of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that
"everyone has the right to be protected from any cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment"427 -a conclusion later affirmed by the Human Rights
Commission 428-both the Canadian Supreme Court and the Human Rights
Commission acknowledged the existence of death row phenomenon and
followed Soering in exploring its topography. More recently, death row
phenomenon played a role in the European Court of Human Rights' decisions
in Iorgov v. Bulgaria,429 and G.B. v. Bulgaria.430 The concept of death row
syndrome was also embraced by the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe in Catholic
Commission for Justice and Peace v. Attorney General.43' In Catholic
Commission, the Chief Justice drew extensively from the Soering case and
enthusiastically adopted its multi-factored approach:
Rejecting a "narrow interpretation" of its holding, i.e., that a variety of
factors and not just Soering's potential incarceration for six to eight years
on death row combined to constitute inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention, the Chief
Justice found that none of these other factors "were either crucial to or
determinative of the result. 432
Thus, under international law, both the concept of death row syndrome and the
totality of circumstances analysis employed in Soering have met with
widespread acceptance.
Lillich, supra note 421, at 710-11.
425. Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779.
426. Lillich, supra note 421, at 704-05.
427. Kindler, [199112 S.C.R. at 780; Constitution Act, 1982, Part I, as reprinted in R.S.C.,
No. 44 (Appendix 1985).
428. Kindler v. Canada, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 48th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 138,
U.N. Doc. A/48/40 (Nov. 1, 1993).
429. See Iorgov V. Bulgaria, [2004] ECHR 40653/98, 78 (Mar. 11, 2004) (LEXIS,
Human Rights Cases) (noting that the applicant did not suffer from genuine death row
phenomenon, which in some cases involved a transfer of the condemned prisoner to the death
house, only to be granted a last minute stay of execution).
430. See G.B. v. Bulgaria, [2004] ECHR 42346/98,179 (Mar. 11, 2004) (LEXIS, Human
Rights Cases) (same).
431. Catholic Comm'n for Justice & Peace in Zimb. v. Attorney General, [ 1993] 2 Z.L.R.
279 (Zimb.), reprinted in 14 HuM. RTs. L.J. 323 (1993).
432. Lillich, supra note 421, at 706.
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In the United States, however, courts have ignored the concept. Perhaps
this is because the Supreme Court rejected a plenary approach to Eighth
Amendment claims in Wilson v. Seiter.433 While the Court said that conditions
of confinement can establish an Eighth Amendment claim "in combination"
when each condition would not do so alone, the Wilson Court limited this
approach to factors having "a mutually enforcing effect that produces the
deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth or
exercise-for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure
to issue blankets."434 The Court emphasized the nature of a single, identifiable
need, and rejected a totality of circumstances approach:
To say that some prison conditions may interact in this fashion is a far cry
from saying that all prison conditions are a seamless web for Eighth
Amendment purposes. Nothing so amorphous as "overall conditions" can
rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific
deprivation of a single human need exists.
Because of the holding in Wilson, it will prove extraordinarily difficult for
a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim of death row syndrome.436
But just because a court will not recognize the syndrome does not mean that the
defense lawyer should not recognize it. Legal duties and professional
obligations are not coterminous. 4  Perhaps the ethical lawyer should recognize
death row syndrome, even if the Supreme Court will not. Recent proceedings
in Connecticut suggest as much.
In December 2004, public defenders attempted to intervene in the case of
Connecticut volunteer Michael Ross, arguing that, because of death row
syndrome, Ross was incompetent to waive his appeals and to volunteer for
execution.438 A superior court judge ruled that the defenders did not have
433. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
434. Id. at 304.
435. Id. at 305.
436. See Rebman, supra note 343, at 607 (noting that courts are reluctant to find
constitutional violations based on psychological effects caused by conditions of confinement).
437. See Faith Lagay, Physician-Assisted Suicide: What's Legal and What's Professional?
AMA VIRTUAL MENTOR, Jan. 2001, http://www.ama-assn.orglama/pub/category/3784.html
(noting "the difference between what's legal and what's ethical; what the state allows residents
to do and what members of a given profession ... believe they ought to do").
438. See Cristoffersen, supra note 50 (noting claims that death row syndrome rendered
Ross incompetent); Wallace-Wells, supra note 415 (same). His lawyers claimed that death row
syndrome rendered Ross incapable of fighting for himself by pursuing his appeals. In his
dissent from the denial of certiorari in Rector v. Bryant, 501 U.S. 1239 (1991), Justice Marshall
said that while the Court had ruled that the execution of insane people was unconstitutional in
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), an unsettled and important question remained:
Whether a prisoner whose mental incapacity makes him incapable of communicating facts that
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standing in the case.439 But after Chief Public Defender Gerald Smyth filed a
habeas petition in federal district court, Chief District Court Judge Robert
Chatigny appeared to be deeply troubled by the specter of death row syndrome.
Speaking with T.R. Paulding, the lawyer representing Ross, Judge Chatigny
warned, "You better be prepared to live with yourself the rest of your life. And
you better be prepared to deal with me if, in the wake of this, an investigation is
conducted and it turns out that [Ross was coerced into volunteering by death
row syndrome], because I'll have your law license."440 Judge Chatigny has
been both applauded and excoriated for the remark, 44 but the moral is clear:
When a volunteer waives his appeals while suffering from death row syndrome,
the stakes are dizzyingly high. The wrong choice may cost lawyers their
careers; the wrong choice will cost condemned prisoners their lives. Thus, it is
imperative to consider the significance of death row syndrome on the prisoner's
decision to waive his appeals.
3. Consequences for Waiver
442
Death row syndrome, like clinical depression, may increase the
likelihood of volunteering, but it is unlikely to succeed as a basis for stopping
an execution. Despite three previous suicide attempts, Michael Ross, a Cornell
University graduate, appeared as a sufficiently lucid agent at his competency
hearing." 3 Unless the seeds of anxiety and depression blossom into overt
psychosis, prisoners suffering from death row syndrome are unlikely to be
would make his execution unlawful or unjust is nonetheless competent to be executed. Rector,
501 U.S. at 1239 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The repressive effects of death row syndrome would
seem to raise serious Rector issues.
439. See Ken Dixon, Execution Closer on Judge's Ruling, CONN. POST, Dec. 16, 2004, at
Al (describing Judge Clifford's ruling).
440. William Yardley, After a Serial Killer Gets a Reprieve, the Spotlight Shines on a
Federal Judge's Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2005, at B5.
441. See id. (quoting various reactions of law professors to Judge Chatigny's conduct); see
also Fred Lucas, Clinton-Appointed Judge Evokes Calls for Impeachment, HUM. EVENTS
ONLiNE, Apr. 29, 2005, http://www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=7311 (discussing
the disapproval of Judge Chatigny' s actions by conservative politicians); Edmund H. Mahony,
Judge's Teleconference Has Experts Talking, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 2,2005, at Al (noting
the contradictory reactions within legal circles to Judge Chatigny's chastising of Paulding).
442. See supra notes 258-63 and associated text (describing effect of depression on desire
for hastened death); supra notes 145-48 and associated text (describing the role of depression in
Robert Smith's decision to pursue execution).
443. Christoffersen, supra note 50. Deemed competent, Michael Ross was executed by the
state of Connecticut on May 13, 2005. Connecticut Serial Killer Put to Death, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/05/13/ross.execution/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2005).
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legally impeded in volunteering by their condition. As long as the prisoner is
competent and makes a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights, he is free to
waive his appeals. 444
The comparison of death row syndrome to torture, however, raises
fundamental questions about the voluntariness of the volunteer's waiver. The
waiver of a constitutionally afforded right is invalid unless it is informed and
freely made.4 5 It is possible to compare the volunteer's waiver of appeal to a
contract between the government and the death row prisoner.446 As a general
rule, a contract that represents a "meeting of the minds" is valid and binding,
but a contract formed under duress is not. A contract formed under duress is
not only voidable by the victim, but inherently void." 7 Given that conditions
on death row can be comparable to physical torture, it is far from clear that
volunteers are situationally capable of assenting to the waiver of their appellate
rights.
Because of the inherently coercive nature of death row syndrome, capital
attorneys cannot know whether a decision to volunteer is truly the will of the
client or whether it is an artifact of isolation, anxiety, depression, hopelessness,
guilt, anger, or self-loathing.
Social psychologists have repeatedly demonstrated that situations are
inestimably powerful in shaping human conduct, leading people to make
decisions that they might think themselves incapable of making." 8  For
444. See supra Part III.A (describing competency tests).
445. See, e.g., Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 164 (1957) ("A rejection of federal
constitutional rights motivated by fear cannot, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an
intelligent waiver.").
446. There may sometimes be a literal contract between the prosecutor and the volunteer.
See supra note 141 (describing Robert Smith's agreement to plead guilty in exchange for the
death penalty).
447. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981).
448. Craig Haney, Psychology and the Limits to Prison Pain: Confronting the Coming
Crisis in Eighth Amendment Law, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 499,502-03 (1997). The author
continued:
Situational structure is now recognized as exerting a powerful influence over
behavior in a range of social settings. Psychologists also have demonstrated that
the cognitive representation of situations exercises an important effect on
behavioral consistency. Contemporary psychological research has provided
empirical documentation of the powerful influence of situational characteristics on
various forms of psychopathology, including depression, and on behavior as
diverse as altruism, coping, cheating, and a police officer's decision to take
someone into custody. In a more directly relevant way, we also know that
variations in social setting and context play an extremely important causal role in
the incidence of criminality, aggression and violence, homicide, and even torture.
Id. (citations omitted).
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example, Solomon Asch found that people would intentionally make false
statements, just to conform to the judgments of others, all because of the
pressure of the situation.449 Stanley Milgram discovered that people were
willing to electrocute other people, even to the point where they might die,
simply because of the social pressure of the situation.45° Philip Zimbardo found
that situational pressures within a mock prison led some subjects to act
sadistically and led others to suffer emotional breakdowns, even though his
experiment lasted for only six days.451 Indeed, social science indicates that
under conditions that are far more benign and far more limited in duration than
those observed on death row, people regularly confess to crimes they did not
commit, simply because of the immense situational pressures applied during
interrogation.452 The situational pressures associated with death row, however,
eclipse these others. Death row truly is the "worst of the worst. ,
453
Death row is inherently coercive. Physically, the environment is
extraordinarily bleak and austere-a cramped universe of sensory deprivation
known to press the limits of human endurance.454 Psychologically, death row is
a place of rampant depression, hopelessness, and apprehension. 455 Because
prisoners average more than ten years under these nightmarish circumstances,
449. See generally Solomon Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of
One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 1 (1956) (explaining a series of
experiments, ostensibly testing visual discrimination, in which a single subject is confronted by
a clearly erroneous group of peers).
450. See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AuTHoRITY (1974) (describing and
analyzing the results of eighteen shock-treatment experiments).
451. See Craig Haney et al., Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, 1 INT'L J.
CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69, 80-81 (1973) (providing an overview of the results of the
experiment); Philip Zimbardo et al., The Mind Is a Formidable Jailer: A Pirandellian Prison,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1973, at 38, (Magazine), (giving a detailed account of the events of the
experiment).
452. See generally GiStu H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS,
CONFESSIONS, AND TESTIMONY (1992) (illustrating some of the processes involved in producing
erroneous testimony and false confessions); S.M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession
Evidence, 52 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 221 (1997) (arguing that there are serious dangers associated
with confession evidence); S.M. Kassin, More on the Psychology of False Confessions, 53 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 320 (1998) (discussing interrogations in which the suspect might come to
believe his own false statements).
453. Cf supra note 175 and accompanying text (describing "the worst of the worst" in
terms of those who deserve execution).
454. See supra note 340 and accompanying text (suggesting same).
455. See supra notes 111-22 and accompanying text (describing rates of depression among
prison populations); supra notes 415-41 and accompanying text (describing death row
syndrome).
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many courts have recognized that long stays on death row constitute-like
torture-inhuman or degrading treatment.456
The pathological influence of death row makes it impossible to determine
whether talk of waiving appeals and of volunteering is truly the will of the
client or an artifact of the environment. Unfortunately, without removing the
prisoner from death row and from the roller coaster of stays and execution
dates, there is no reliable means to ascertain the client's true motivation. This
uncertainty has ethical consequences: Without the ability to know-not merely
to suspect, but to know-that the client's waiver of appeals is genuine, the
ethical lawyer cannot acquiesce to the volunteering client's request. The stakes
are simply too high, the risk that the request is situationally coerced is simply
too great. Even if the lawyer does not believe that the duty of beneficence is
incompatible with assisting the client in ending his life,457 the inability of the
client to make a voluntary waiver of his appeals should bar the attorney from
participating in such proceedings.
VI. Conclusion
This Article has argued that the phenomenon of the death row volunteer is
a serious and worsening problem for capital attorneys,458 that competence
hearings are an inadequate check on the problem,459 and that the Model Rules
function more like Rorschach blots than binding rules (and therefore are
another inadequate check on the problem).46° Medical ethics, while contentious
and ever-evolving, provides some bright-line guidance to the capital lawyer
asked to traverse a labyrinth of ethics without a compass.461 Because the roles
of doctors and lawyers are comparable in many important ways,4 2 and because
463terminal illness is analogous to pending execution in many important ways,
the medical community's prohibition against euthanasia and physician-assisted
456. See supra notes 421-32 (outlining the acknowledgement of death row syndrome by
international courts).
457. See supra Part V.B.3 (suggesting that analogizing the situation of the death row
lawyer to that of the physician involved with terminally ill patients leads to the conclusion that
attorneys probably cannot honor their duty to the client by participating in the waiver of
appellate rights).
458. See supra Part H.C (suggesting same).
459. See supra Part IH.A (suggesting same).
460. See supra Part IV.A (suggesting same).
461. See supra Part V.A (suggesting same).
462. See supra Part V.B.1 (suggesting same).
463. See supra Part V.B.2 (suggesting same).
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suicide suggests that lawyers should not assist condemned prisoners in the
waiver of their appeals .464 It is incompatible with the duty of beneficence to do
so. The recognition of death row syndrome suggests that even those lawyers
who do not believe that a duty of beneficence prohibits them from assisting
volunteers should not participate in the waiver of capital appeals.465 The risk
that prisoners have made their decisions under duress is too great.
Client-centered attorneys need to understand the immeasurable pressures
exerted upon their clients by the conditions of death row and must not blindly
follow orders from their despairing clients, simply because the client has told
them to give up. Just as soldiers should reject unlawful orders to murder
civilians,466 lawyers should resist the volunteering of situationally disabled
death row defendants.
Cause-centered attorneys who resist clients' requests to volunteer should
not do so because they have paternalistically substituted their judgment for that
of their clients, and because they think they know better. Rather, they should
refuse to participate in the waiver of appellate rights because it is incompatible
with the lawyer's duty of beneficence and because they cannot meaningfully
distinguish the will of their client from the effects of death row syndrome.
Taking such a stand means that clients may be stripped of autonomy. It
means that the client who demands execution may be denied. 467 Under this
approach, individuals like Socrates or Joan of Arc who embrace execution over
confinement for lucid and principled reasons will lose the opportunity to choose
their outcomes. 4 8 It means that prisoners may be kept alive against their will
464. See supra Part V.B.3 (suggesting same).
465. See supra Part V.C.3 (suggesting same).
466. See supra note 47 (describing the legal standards for identifying when soldiers are
obligated to disobey an unlawful order).
467. See White, supra note 55, at 859 (quoting Bruce Ledewitz as stating that his top
priority is preventing the state from achieving its immoral goal of killing someone and that
relative to that priority, "the defendant's desire to be killed is not important to me"). For a
discussion of the case of Smith v. State and how Smith's attorneys were discharged from
representation, see supra Part III.C.
468. Philosopher John Stuart Mill believed that it is very rational to choose execution over
life imprisonment. He wrote:
What comparison can there really be, in a point of severity between consigning a
man to the short pang of a rapid death, and immuring him in a living tomb, there to
linger out what may be a long life in the hardest and most monotonous toil, without
any of its alleviation or rewards--debarred from all pleasant sights and sounds, and
cut off from all earthly hope, except a slight mitigation of bodily restraint, or a
small improvement of diet?
Smith v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1264, 1273 (Ind. 1997) (quoting John Stuart Mill) (citation omitted);
see also Alex Kozinski, Tinkering with Death, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 10, 1997, at 48, 51
(noting that one defendant's "decision to forego the protracted trauma of numerous death-row
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and forced to stage appeals they do not want.46 9 But recognizing the coercive
influence of death row syndrome, and the corruptive effect it exerts upon
choice, is a necessary step to stem the tide of volunteers whose spirits have
been broken by hard years of anxiety, depression, and hopelessness.
To remedy the coercive influences of death row, the dehumanizing
elements of death row must be counteracted. The courts must distill an antidote
to death row syndrome. Condemned prisoners must not be left languishing on
death row for decades. They must not be buried alive in cramped cells where
sensory deprivation pushes the bounds of endurance. They must not be
subjected to a roller coaster of uncertainty and doubt. Until these pathological
influences can be countered and until death row syndrome can be exorcised
from American prisons, the volunteer's waiver of constitutionally guaranteed
appeals cannot be knowing and voluntary. Until condemned prisoners are
accordingly able to choose executions free from the cloud of duress, ethical
lawyers cannot in good conscience participate in these proceedings.
appeals was rational").
469. See, e.g., Robert Lee Massie, Fixin' to Die: Let My Death Give Life to a Challenge of
California's Machinery of Execution, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 14, 2001, at A19 (describing the
obstacles Massie faced in attempting to abandon the appeals process). The article continued:
Take my case. When I came up for trial in 1979, my state-appointed lawyer tried to
prevent me from pleading guilty. When he failed, and I was sentenced to death,
another state-appointed lawyer appealed my conviction to the state Supreme Court
against my wishes. The Rose Bird court reversed my conviction because my state-
appointed lawyer didn't agree with my guilty plea. It sent the case back for a retrial
that I never asked for and didn't want.
Id. But see Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 167 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting
that capital appeals exist not just for the defendant, but also for the state).
